Content created by: Prem Pahlajrai
Last Updated: Thu 11/11/2004 09:17 PM
| HPS: | Hari Prasad Shastri (1956), Panchadasi ‐ A Treatise on Advaita Metaphysics by Swami Vidyaranya. London: Shanti Sadan. |
| SS: | Swāmī Swāhānanda (1967), Pañcadaśī of Śrī Vidyāraṇya Swāmī. Mylapore: Sri Ramkrishna Math. |
| JBS: | Jñānānanda Bhārathi Svāminaḥ (1983), Panchadasi. Madras: Sri Abhinav Vidyatheertha Mahaswamigal Educational Trust. |
ātmānaṃ ced vijānīyād ayam asmīti pūruṣaḥ
kim icchan kasya kāmāya śarīram anusaṃjvaret ||1||
ātmānam cet vijānīyāt ayam asmi iti pūruṣaḥ |
kim icchan kasya kāmāya śarīram anusaṃjvaret ||
HPS: "When a man (Puruṣa) has realised the identity of his own Self with That (Paramātman), desiring what and to please whom should he allow his lower self (body and mind) to be afflicted?"
SS: "When a man (Puruṣa) has realized the identity of his own Self with the Paramātman, desiring what and for whose sake should he allow himself to be afflicted following the body's affliction?"
JBS: "If a person realizes the Self as 'I am this' wishing what and for whose desire is he to worry about the body?"
asyāḥ śruter abhiprāyaḥ samyagatra vicāryate
jīvanmuktasya yā tṛptiḥ sā tena viśadāyate ||2||
asyāḥ śruteḥ abhiprāyaḥ samyak atra vicāryate |
jīvanmuktasya yā tṛptiḥ sā tena viśadāyate ||
HPS: In this chapter we discuss the meaning of this Śruti. The perfect satisfaction of one who has achieved illumination in this life will be made readily comprehensible by our reflections.
SS: In this chapter we exhaustively analyze the meaning of this Śruti. Thereby the perfect satisfaction of a man liberated in this life will be clearly known.
JBS: the purport of this Vedic passage is well enquired into here. The satisfaction that he Jīvanmukta (one liberated even when living) has is made clear by it (the enquiry).
māyābhāsena jīveśau karotīti śrutatvataḥ
kalpitāv eva jīveśau tābhyāṃ sarvaṃ prakalpitam ||3||
māyā ābhāsena jīva īśau karoti iti śrutatvataḥ |
kalpitau eva jīva īśau tābhyām sarvam prakalpitam ||
HPS: On the authority of the Śruti we come to know that Māyā, reflecting Brahman, creates both Jīva and Īśvara. Jīva and Īśvara in their turn create the whole of the rest of the universe.
SS: The Śruti says that Māyā reflecting Brahman, creates both Jīva and Īśvara. Jīva and Īśvara, in their turn, create the whole of the rest of the universe.
JBS: As it is heard (from the Veda) that Māyā by the reflection creates the Jīva (Individual Soul) and God the Ruler (of the universe), both the Soul and God are only creations. All (the universe) is created by them both.
īkṣaṇādi praveśāntā sṛṣṭir īśena kalpitā
jāgradādi vimokṣāntaḥ saṃsāro jīvakalpitaḥ ||4||
īkṣaṇa ādi praveśa antā sṛṣṭiḥ īśena kalpitā |
jāgrat ādi vimokṣa antaḥ saṃsāraḥ jīvakalpitaḥ ||
HPS: The creation of Īśvara extends from his willing to create the world to the moment when he himself enters his creation. The world from the waking state to the state of release which follows illumination is the creation of Jīva.
SS: From the determination of Īśvara to create, down to his entrance into the created objects, is the creation of Īśvara. from the waking state to ultimate release, the cause of all pleasures and pains, is the creation of Jīva.
JBS: The creation from 'considering' to 'entering' is the creation of the Ruler. The Saṃsāra from the waking state to the state of liberation is the creation of the Jīva.
bhrama adhiṣṭhāna bhūtātmā kūṭastha asaṅga cidvapuḥ |
anyonya adhyāsataḥ asaṅga dhīstha jīvaḥ atra pūruṣaḥ ||
HPS: The substratum of illusion is the immutable, associationless, pure consciousness, Brahman, the Self of all beings. When through mutual superimposition Brahman becomes associated with the intellect, an association which is phenomenal and not real, He is known as Jīva or Puruṣa.
SS: The substratum of illusions is Brahman, the immutable, associationless, pure consciousness, the Self of all beings. When through mutual superimposition Brahman becomes associated with the intellect, an association which is phenomenal and not real, He is known as Jīva or Puruṣa.
JBS: The Self, who is the substratum of mistake and whose nature is unchangeable and un‐attached Consciousness, becoming the Jīva reflected in unattached intellect by reason of mutual superimposition, is the Person here (mentioned in the opening stanza).
sādhiṣṭhāno vimokṣādau jīvo 'dhikriyate na tu
kevalo niradhiṣṭhāna vibhrānteḥ kvāpy asiddhitaḥ ||6||
sādhiṣṭhānaḥ vimokṣa ādau jīvaḥ adhikriyate na tu |
kevalaḥ niradhiṣṭhāna vibhrānteḥ kva api asiddhitaḥ ||
HPS: Jīva, with Kūṭastha as his real basis, appears to become an agent and tries to obtain the pleasures of heaven and earth. Cidābhāsa, the reflection of pure consciousness, is fundamentally Kūṭastha. Jīvahood is due to superimposition, and superimposition inevitably implies as substratum. In fact, Cidābhāsa is nothing but Kūṭastha.
SS: Jīva, with Kūṭastha as his substratum, becomes an agent and seeks liberation or the pleasures of heaven and earth. Cidābhāsa, the reflection of pure consciousness, alone cannot be so, for superimposition is not possible without a substratum.
JBS: The Jīva along with the substratum (the Self) is competent for liberation etc. and not the mere Jīva for a mistaken conception without a substratum is not anywhere possible.
adhiṣṭhānāṃśa saṃyuktaṃ bhramāṃśam avalambate
yadā tadā 'haṃ saṃsārīty evaṃ jīvo 'bhimanyate ||7||
adhiṣṭhāna aṃśa saṃyuktam bhrama aṃśam avalambate |
yadā tadā aham saṃsārī iti evam jīvaḥ abhimanyate ||
HPS: Jīva has the immutable Kūṭastha as his basis, but he believes himself to be the gross and subtle bodies, the products of illusion. He then thinks himself to be a saṃsārin, subject to the doubtful pleasures and the real pains and sufferings of the world.
SS: When Jīva having the immutable Kūṭastha as his basis wrongly identifies himself with the gross and subtle bodies, he comes to think of himself as bound by the pleasures and pains of this world.
JBS: When the Jīva relies upon the aspect of mistake mixed with the aspect of the substratum, he then thinks thus – "I am a saṃsārī (the wanderer)".
bhramāṃśasya tiraskārād adhiṣṭhāna pradhānatā
yadā tadā cidātmāham asaṅgo 'smīti buddhyate ||8||
bhrama aṃśasya tiraskārāt adhiṣṭhāna pradhānatā |
yadā tadā cidātmā aham asaṅgaḥ asmi iti buddhyate ||
HPS: When Jīva gives up his attachment to the products of illusion, the three bodies, he achieves the nature of his substratum, pure consciousness and associationlessness.
SS: When Jīva gives up his attachment to his illusory portion, the nature of the substratum becomes predominant and he realizes that he is associationless and of the nature of pure consciousness.
JBS: When discarding the mistaken aspect prominence is given to the substratum, he recognises 'I am conscious Self. I am quite un‐attached.'
na asaṅge ahaṃkṛtiḥ yuktā katham asmi iti cet śṛṇu |
ekaḥ mukhyaḥ dvau amukhyau iti arthas trividhaḥ ahamaḥ ||
HPS: It may be objected: "How can the idea of egoity arise in the detached Kūṭastha? You (the Vedāntin) have to attribute egoity to it." Our reply is that the word 'I' is used in three senses, of which one is primary and the other two secondary.
SS: (Doubt:) How can the idea of egoity arise in the detached Kūṭastha? you have to attribute egoity to it. (Reply:) 'I' is used in three senses, of which one is primary and the other two secondary.
JBS: The sense of I is not possible in the (Self which is) un‐attached. How can there be an 'I am'? – if so asked, listen. The 'I has three kinds of significances, one primary and the other two not primary.
anyonyādhyāsa rūpeṇa kūṭasthābhāsayor vapuḥ
ekībhūya bhavenmukhyas tatra mūḍhaiḥ prayujyate ||10||
anyonya adhyāsa rūpeṇa kūṭastha ābhāsayoḥ vapuḥ |
ekībhūya bhavet mukhyas tatra mūḍhaiḥ prayujyate ||
HPS: The primary meaning of 'I' is the sense in which the dull‐witted use it. They identify the immutable Kūṭastha with the reflected intelligence, Cidābhāsa. The source of this error is mutual superimposition.
SS: The immutable Kūṭastha becomes identified with the reflected intelligence, Cidābhāsa, due to mutual superimposition. This is the primary meaning of 'I' in which the spiritually dull people use it.
JBS: The form of the changeless Self and of the reflection becoming one by reason of mutual superimposition is the primary (meaning). (The word 'I') is used in that sense by the ignorant.
pṛthak ābhāsa kūṭasthau amukhyau tatra tattvavit |
paryāyeṇa prayuṅkte aham śabdam loke ca vaidike ||
HPS: The wise use the word 'I' in the two secondary senses, referring it to either Kūṭastha or Cidābhāsa but differentiating one from the other. They use the same word 'I' either in the worldly or in the scriptural sense, meaning Cidābhāsa or Kūṭastha respectively.
SS: 'I' in the two secondary senses refer to either Kūṭastha or Cidābhāsa but one is differentiated from the other. The wise use the same word 'I' either in the worldly or in the philosophical sense, meaning Cidābhāsa or Kūṭastha respectively.
JBS: The reflection and the changeless Self are severally the non‐primary significances. The knower of truth uses the word 'I' alternately in worldly matters and in matters of Vedic import.
laukika vyavahare 'haṃ gacchāmīty ādike budhaḥ
vivicyaiva cidābhāsaṃ kūṭasthāt taṃ vivakṣati ||12||
laukika vyavahare aham gacchāmi iti ādike budhaḥ |
vivicya eva cidābhāsam kūṭasthāt tam vivakṣati ||
HPS: In common parlance the wise use the expression 'I am going', meaning Cidābhāsa. They differentiate Cidābhāsa from Kūṭastha by the power of reflection.
SS: From the conventional standpoint, the wise use the expression, 'I am going', meaning Cidābhāsa, differentiating it from Kūṭastha.
JBS: In worldly transactions, like 'I go' etc., the knower separates the reflected consciousness from the changeless Self and intends to signify only the former.
asaṅgaḥ aham cidātmā aham iti śastrīya dṛṣṭitaḥ |
aham śabdam prayuṅkte ayam kūṭasthe kevale budhaḥ ||
HPS: From the philosophical standpoint the wise mean by their 'I' the pure Kūṭastha. They say: 'I am unattached. I am the One‐without‐a‐second."
SS: From the philosophical standpoint the wise mean by their 'I' the pure Kūṭastha. In this sense they say: 'I am unattached. I am the Spirit Itself.'
JBS: The knower uses the word 'I' in the sense of the pure changeless Self in saying 'I am un‐attached I am the conscious Self' from the view point of the Śāstra.
jñānitā ajñānite tu ātmā ābhasasya eva na ca ātmanaḥ |
tathā ca katham ābhāsaḥ kūṭasthaḥ asmi iti buddhyatām ||
HPS: The opponent may here object that it is Cidābhāsa that can be called wise or ignorant; such terms cannnot be applied to Kūṭastha. Then how can Cidābhāsa, who is different from Kūṭastha, say: "I am Kūṭastha"? How can the expression 'I am Brahman' be rightly attributed to him?
SS: (Doubt:) Wise or ignorant are terms that can be applied to Cidābhāsa and never to Kūṭastha. Then how can Cidābhāsa, who is different from Kūṭastha, say: 'I am Brahman or Kūṭastha'?
JBS: Being a knower and being ignorant are both only for the reflection and not for the (pure) Self. While so, how can the reflection have the idea "I am the changeless Self"?
nāyaṃ doṣaścidābhāsaḥ kūṭasthaikasvabhāvavān
ābhāsatvasya mithyātvāt kūṭasthatvāvaśeṣaṇāt ||15||
na ayam doṣaḥ cidābhāsaḥ kūṭastha ekasvabhāvavān |
ābhāsatvasya mithyātvāt kūṭasthatva avaśeṣaṇāt ||
HPS: The reply of the Vedāntin is that this objection is groundless because Cidābhāsa has no real existence independent of Kūṭastha. An image in a mirror is not distinct from the object of which it is a reflection. When the accidental factors are negated, only Kūṭastha remains.
SS: (Reply:) There is no harm, for Cidābhāsa has no real existence independent of Kūṭastha. An image in a mirror is not distinct from the object of which it is a reflection. When the adventitious factors are negated, only Kūṭastha remains.
JBS: This is not a fault. The reflected consciousness is really of the nature of the changeless Self only, as the reflectedness is unreal and the state of being the changeless Self is the residue.
kūṭasthaḥ asmi iti bodhaḥ api mithyā cet na iti kaḥ vadet |
na hi satyatayā abhiṣṭam rajju sarpa visarpaṇam ||
HPS: If the opponent firther says that the statement 'I am Kūṭastha' is also illusory, our reply is: "Who denies it?" Any motion attributed to the snake superimposed on a rope is unreal and cannot be admitted.
SS: (Doubt:) The idea, 'I am Kūṭastha' is also illusory. (Reply:) Who denies it? Any motion attributed to the snake superimposed on a rope is unreal and cannot be admitted.
JBS: If it is urged that even the knowledge "I am the changeless Self" is unreal, who says it is not? The going away of the snake that seemed in the rope is certainly not accepted as truth.
tādṛśenāpi bodhena saṃsāro hi nivartate
yakṣānurūpo hi balir ity āhur laukikā janāḥ ||17||
tādṛśena api bodhena saṃsāraḥ hi nivartate |
yakṣa anurūpaḥ hi baliḥ iti āhuḥ laukikā janāḥ ||
HPS: The knowledge of the nature of Kūṭastha ('I am Brahman') leads to the cessation of pleasure and pain. There is a common saying that a scarifice offered to a deity must be appropriate to that deity.
SS: The idea 'I am Brahman' leads to the cessation of pleasure and pain of the world. There is a common saying that sacrifice offered to a deity must be appropriate to that deity.
JBS: Even by such a knowledge, Saṃsāra does vanish. For the people of the world themselves say "The oblation must be appropriate to the Yakṣa (the deity sought to be propitiated)".
tasmāt ābhāsa puruṣaḥ sakūṭasthaḥ vivicya tam |
kūṭasthaḥ asmi iti vijñātum arhati iti abhyadhāt śrutiḥ ||
HPS: The Śruti declares that Cidābhāsa, based on Kūṭastha and known as Puruṣa, should differentiate Kūṭastha from illusion, and that he is then justified in calling himself Kūṭastha (Brahman).
SS: The Śruti says that Cidābhāsa, based on Kūṭastha and known as Puruṣa, should differentiate Kūṭastha from illusion, and that he is then justified in saying 'I am Kūṭastha (Brahman).'
JBS: Therefore the reflected 'person' who is accompanied by the changeless Self is competent to know "I am the changeless Self" by distinguishing it from himself – so says the Veda.
asandigdhāviparyasta bodho dehātmanīkṣyate
tadvad atreti nirṇetum ayam ity abhidhīyate ||19||
asandigdha aviparyasta bodhaḥ dehātmani īkṣyate |
tadvat atra iti nirṇetum ayam iti abhidhīyate ||
HPS: In speaking of himself the common man seems to be convinced of his identity with the body. When a similar conviction is achieved of the identity of the Jīva with Brahman, the term 'That' is known to refer to Brahman.
SS: In speaking of himself the common man seems to be convinced of his identity with the body. A similar conviction about this Self as Brahman is necessary for liberation. This is the meaning of 'this' in 'I am this'.
JBS: A cognition which is neither doubtful nor mistaken is seen in (the common idea of) the body being the Self. To emphasise that it must be like it here also, the word 'This' is used.
dehātmajñānavajjñānaṃ dehātmajñānabādhakam
ātmany eva bhaved yasya sa necchannapi mucyate ||20||
dehātmajñānavat jñānam dehātmajñāna bādhakam |
ātmani eva bhavet yasya sa na icchan api mucyate ||
HPS: When one is as firmly convinced of oneś identity with Brahman as an ordinary man is convinced of his identity with the body, release follows, whether one seeks it or not.
SS: When a man is as firmly convinced of his identity with Brahman as an ordinary man is convinced of his identity with the body, he is liberated even if he does not wish for it.
JBS: He whose knowledge in the Self alone is (as strong) as the (ordinary) knowledge of the body being the Self and disperses that knowledge of the body being the Self is freed (from bondage) even if he does not wish it.
ayam ity aparokṣatvam ucyate cet tad ucyatām
svayaṃ prakāśa caitanyam aparokṣaṃ sadā yataḥ ||21||
ayam iti aparokṣatvam ucyate cet tad ucyatām |
svayam prakāśa caitanyam aparokṣam sadā yataḥ ||
HPS: It may be objected that the term 'That' refers to something knowable and that it cannot apply to Brahman, who is unknown. Our reply is that Brahman as the Self is self‐luminous and can ever be directly experienced.
SS: (Doubt:) The term 'this' in 'I am this' refers to something knowable and that it cannot apply to Brahman, who is unknown. (Reply:) All right. Brahman as the Self is self‐luminous and can always be directly experienced.
JBS: If it is urged that patent‐ness is denoted by 'This' let it be so denoted, for the self‐luminous consciousness is always patent.
parokṣam aparokṣaṃ ca jñānam ajñānam ity adaḥ
nityāparokṣa rūpe 'pi dvayaṃ syād daśame yathā ||22||
parokṣam aparokṣam ca jñānam ajñānam iti adaḥ |
nitya aparokṣa rūpe api dvayam syāt daśame yathā ||
HPS: The Self is ever cognised. We speak of his being known directly or indirectly, being known or unknown, as in the illustration of the tenth man.
SS: The Self is ever cognized. We speak of Its being known directly or indirectly, being known or unknown, as in the illustration of the tenth man.
JBS: Being patent and being not patent, knowledge and ignorance – these two can be even in relation to what is always patent just as in the case of the 'tenth' man.
nava saṃkhyāhṛtajñāno daśamo vibhramāt tadā
na vetti daśamo 'smīti vīkṣyamāṇo 'pi tān nava ||23||
nava saṃkhyā hṛtajñānaḥ daśamaḥ vibhramāt tadā |
na vetti daśamaḥ asmi iti vīkṣyamāṇaḥ api tān nava ||
HPS: The tenth man counts the other nine, each of whom is visible to him, but forgets himself, though his Self is ever known to him.
SS: The tenth man counts the other nine, each of whom is visible to him, but forgets himself the tenth, though all the time seeing himself.
JBS: Owing to delusion the tenth man with his knowledge obsessed by the number nine does not know then that the tenth exists even though he is there looking at those nine.
na bhāti nāsti daśama iti svaṃ daśamaṃ tadā
matvā vakti tad ajñānakṛtam āvaraṇaṃ viduḥ ||24||
na bhāti na asti daśama iti svam daśamam tadā |
matvā vakti tad ajñānakṛtam āvaraṇam viduḥ ||
HPS: Being himself the tenth, he does not find him. The tenth is not visible to him, though ever present. The reason is that his presence is veiled by ignorance or Māyā.
SS: Being himself the tenth, he does not find him. 'The tenth is not visible, he is absent' so he says. Intelligent people say that this is due to his presence being obscured by ignorance or Māyā.
JBS: At that time, though he is the tenth, he thinks and says, "The tenth is not seen, is not (here)". This which is the effect of ignorance is known as 'Screening'.
nadyāṃ mamāra daśama iti socan praroditi
ajñānakṛta vikṣepaṃ rodanādiṃ vidur budhāḥ ||25||
nadyām mamāra daśama iti socan praroditi |
ajñānakṛta vikṣepam rodana ādim viduḥ budhāḥ ||
HPS: He is grieved and cries, because he believes the tenth to have drowned in the stream. The act of weeping, a result of false superimposition, is due to illusion.
SS: He is grieved and cries, because he believes the tenth to have drowned in the river. The act of weeping, a result of false superimposition, is due to illusion.
JBS: Stricken with grief, he weeps aloud saying that the tenth has died in the river. The learned know this weeping etc. as 'Distraction' caused by ignorance.
na mṛto daśamo 'stīti śrutvāptavacanaṃ tadā
paroksatvena daśamaṃ vetti svargādi lokavat ||26||
na mṛtaḥ daśamaḥ asti iti śrutvā āptavacanam tadā |
paroksatvena daśamam vetti svarga ādi lokavat ||
HPS: When told by a competent person that the tenth is not dead, he believes by indirect knowledge that he is alive, just as one believe sin the existence of heaven on the authority of Śruti.
SS: When told by a competent person that the tenth is not dead, he believes by indirect knowledge that he is alive, just as one believes in the existence of heaven on the authority of the Śruti.
JBS: When he hears the word of a friend that the tenth is not dead but does exist, he then knows the tenth indirectly just as one knows about heaven and other worlds.
tvam eva daśamo 'sīti gaṇayitva pradarśitaḥ
aparokṣatayā jñātvā hṛṣyaty eva na roditi ||27||
tvam eva daśamaḥ asi iti gaṇayitva pradarśitaḥ |
aparokṣatayā jñātvā hṛṣyati eva na roditi ||
HPS: When he is told: "Thou art the tenth", and counts himself along with the others, he stops weeping and grieving owing to the direct knowledge of the tenth, that is, himself.
SS: When each man is told: ‘you are the tenth' and he counts himself along with the others, he stops weeping and grieving owing to the direct knowledge of the tenth, that is, himself.
JBS: When he is shown after counting that "you yourself are the tenth", he knows (the tenth) directly and becomes certainly glad and ceases to weep.
ajñānāvṛtivikṣepa dvividha jñāna tṛptayaḥ
śokāpagama ity ete yojanīyaścidātmani ||28||
ajñāna āvṛti vikṣepa dvividha jñāna tṛptayaḥ |
śoka apagama iti ete yojanīyaḥ cidātmani ||
HPS: Seven stages can be distinguished in respect of the Self: ignorance, obscuration, superimposition, indirect knowledge, direct knowledge, cessation of grief and the rise of unending satisfaction.
SS: Seven stages can be distinguished in respect of the Self: ignorance, obscuration, superimposition, indirect knowledge, direct knowledge, cessation of grief and the rise of perfect satisfaction.
JBS: 1. Ignorance, 2. Screening, 3. Distraction, 4. and 5. the Two‐fold Knowledge (indirect and direct), 6. Satisfaction and 7. Cessation of sorrow – These (seven stages) have to be applied in the case of the conscious Self (also).
saṃsārāsakta cittaḥ san cidābhāsaḥ kadācana |
svayam prakāśa kūṭastham svatattvam na eva vetti ayam ||
HPS: Cidābhāsa with his mind devoted to the empirical existence does not know that he is the self‐evident Kūṭastha.
SS: Cidābhāsa with his mind devoted to the worldly existence does not know that he is the self‐evident Kūṭastha.
JBS: 1. (Ignorance). This reflected consciousness (the Jīva) with his mind engrossed by Saṃsāra does not at all ever recognise the self‐luminous changeless Self as his own true nature.
na bhāti nāsti kūṭastha iti vakti prasaṅgataḥ
kartā bhoktāham asmīti vikṣepaṃ pratipadyate ||30||
na bhāti na asti kūṭastha iti vakti prasaṅgataḥ |
kartā bhoktā aham asmi iti vikṣepam pratipadyate ||
HPS: 'Kūṭastha is not manifest, there is no Kūṭastha' are the ideas that characterise the obscuring stage caused by ignorance. The Jīva further says that he is the doer, and enjoys the results of his actions. This stage is the result of superimposition.
SS: 'Kūṭastha is not manifest, there is no Kūṭastha' are the ideas that characterize the obscuring stage caused by ignorance. The Jīva further says, 'I am the doer and enjoyer', and experiences pains and pleasures, the result of superimposition.
JBS: 2. (Screening). He says "The changeless Self does not shine nor does he exist". 3. (Distraction). As a consequence, he gets the distraction "I am a doer, I am an enjoyer".
asti kūṭastha ity ādau parokṣaṃ vetti vārtayā
paścāt kūṭastha evāsmīty evaṃ vetti vicārataḥ ||31||
asti kūṭastha iti ādau parokṣam vetti vārtayā |
paścāt kūṭastha eva asmi iti evam vetti vicārataḥ ||
SS: From the teacher he comes to know of the existence of Kūṭastha indirectly. Then, by means of discrimination, he directly realizes 'I am Kūṭastha'.
JBS: 4. (Indirect knowledge). He at first knows indirectly by hearsay "The changeless Self exists". 5. (Direct knowledge). Later on by enquiry he knows thus:‐ "I am the changeless Self only".
kartā bhoktety evam ādi śokajātaṃ pramuñcati
kṛtaṃ kṛtyaṃ prāpaṇīyaṃ prāptam ity eva tuṣyati ||32||
kartā bhoktā iti evam ādi śokajātam pramuñcati |
kṛtam kṛtyam prāpaṇīyam prāptam iti eva tuṣyati ||
SS: Now he is free from the erroneous idea that he is a doer and an enjoyer of the fruit of his actions. With this conviction his grief comes to an end. He feels that he has accomplished all that was to be accomplished and experiences perfect satisfaction.
JBS: 6. (Cessation of sorrow). He gives up the host of griefs "I am a doer, an enjoyer" and the like. 7. (Satisfaction). He is certainly glad that what has to be done has been done and that what has to be achieved has been achieved.
ajñānam āvṛtis tadvad vikṣepaśca parokṣadhīḥ
aparokṣamatiḥ śokamokṣas tṛptir niraṅkuśā ||33||
ajñānam āvṛtis tadvat vikṣepaḥ ca parokṣadhīḥ |
aparokṣa matiḥ śoka mokṣas tṛptiḥ niraṅkuśā ||
SS: These are the seven stages of Jīva: ignorance, obscuration, superimposition, indirect knowledge, direct knowledge, freedom from grief and unrestricted bliss.
JBS: Ignorance, Screening, similarly Distraction, Indirect knowledge, Direct knowledge, release from sorrow, and unrestrained Satisfaction.
sapta avasthā imāḥ santi cidābhāsasya tāsu imau |
bandha mokṣau sthitau tatra tisraḥ bandha kṛtaḥ smṛtāḥ ||
SS: The reflected consciousness, Cidābhāsa, is affected by these seven stages. They are the cause of bondage and also of release. The first three of them are described as causing bondage.
JBS: These seven stages are the Cidābhāsa (the Reflected Self or Jīva). Bondage and Release – these two are included in these (seven). Three out of them are declared to be the causes of bondage.
na jānāmīty udāsīna vyavahārasya kāraṇam
vicāraprāgabhāvena yuktam ajñānam īritam ||35||
na jānāmi iti udāsīna vyavahārasya kāraṇam |
vicāra prāk abhāvena yuktam ajñānam īritam ||
SS: Ignorance is the state characterized by 'I do not know' and is the cause of the indifference about truth, lasting as long as discrimination does not mature.
JBS: The state of 'I do not know' which is the cause of an indifferent attitude coupled with the anterior absence of enquiry is called Ignorance.
amārgeṇa vicāryātha nāsti no bhāti cety asau
viparīta vyavahṛtir āvṛteḥ kāryam iṣyate ||36||
amārgeṇa vicārya atha na asti naḥ bhāti ca iti asau |
viparīta vyavahṛtiḥ āvṛteḥ kāryam iṣyate ||
SS: The result of the obscuring of the spiritual truth caused by ignorance is such thoughts as 'Kūṭastha does not exist' 'Kūṭastha is not known', which is contrary to truth. This happens when discrimination is not conducted along scriptural lines.
JBS: By enquiring in an improper way, the saying of the opposite. 'The changeless Self does /not/ exist, does /not/ shine' is the result of Screening.
dehadvayacidābhāsarūpo vikṣepa īritaḥ
kartṛtvādy akhilaḥ śokaḥ saṃsārākhyo 'sya bandhakaḥ ||37||
deha dvaya cidābhāsa rūpaḥ vikṣepa īritaḥ |
kartṛtva ādi akhilaḥ śokaḥ saṃsāra ākhyaḥ asya bandhakaḥ ||
SS: The stage in which Cidābhāsa identifies himself with the subtle and gross bodies is called superimposition. In it he is subject to bondage and suffers as a result of the idea of his being the doer and enjoyer.
JBS: Taking the form of Cidābhāsa (Jīva) with its two bodies (subtle and gross) is called Distraction. All grief caused by doership, etc., the bondage known as Saṃsāra, is because of this.
ajñānam āvṛtiḥ ca ete vikṣepāt prāk prasiddhyataḥ |
yadyapi athāpi avasthe te vikṣepasya eva na ātmanaḥ ||
SS: Though ignorance and the obscuring of the Self precede superimposition and Cidābhāsa himself is the result of this superimposition, still the first two stages belong not to Kūṭastha but to Cidābhāsa.
JBS: Though Ignorance and Screening are anterior to Distraction, yet they are states of Distraction alone and not the Self.
vikṣepotpattitaḥ pūrvam api vikśepasaṃskṛtiḥ
asty eva tad avasthātvam aviruddhaṃ tatas tayoḥ ||39||
vikṣepa utpattitaḥ pūrvam api vikśepa saṃskṛtiḥ |
asti eva tad avasthātvam aviruddham tatas tayoḥ ||
SS: Before the rise of superimposition the impressions or seeds of superimposition exist. Therefore, it is not inconsistent to say that the first two stages belong to Cidābhāsa alone.
JBS: Even before the coming into existence of Distraction, there is certainly the impression of (tendency for) the Distraction. Therefore it is nor wrong to say that they are states of Distraction.
brahmaṇy āropitatvena brahmāvasthe ime iti
na śaṅkanīyaṃ sarvāsāṃ brahmaṇy evādhiropaṇāt ||40||
brahmaṇi āropitatvena brahmāvasthe ime iti |
na śaṅkanīyam sarvāsām brahmaṇi eva adhiropaṇāt ||
SS: These two stages do not exist in Brahman, although they are superimposed on Him, as Brahman is the basis on which the superimposed stands.
JBS: It must not be thought that these two are the states of Brahman by reason of their being superimposed on Brahman, for /all/ the states are superimposed on Brahman only.
saṃsāryahaṃ vibuddho 'haṃ niḥśokas tuṣṭa ity api
jīvagā uttarāvasthā bhānti na brahmagā yadi ||41||
saṃsārī aham vibuddhaḥ aham niḥśokas tuṣṭa iti api |
jīvagā uttarā avasthā bhānti na brahmagā yadi ||
SS: (Doubt:) 'I am worldly', 'I am endowed with knowledge', 'I am griefless', 'I am happy' and so forth are expressions which refer to states of the Jīva, and they have no relation to Brahman.
JBS: If it is urged that the later stages 'I am a Saṃsārī', 'I am a knower', 'I am free from grief', 'I am content' are seen as belonging to the Jīva and not as belonging to Brahman, ...
tarhy ajño 'haṃ brahmasattvabhāne mad dṛṣṭito na hi
iti pūrve avasthe ca bhāsete jīvage khalu ||42||
tarhi ajñaḥ aham brahmasattvabhāne mad dṛṣṭitaḥ na hi |
iti pūrve avasthe ca bhāsete jīvage khalu ||
SS: (Reply:) Then the two stages prior to superimposition also should be attributed to the Jīva, for he says: 'I do not know', 'I do not see Brahman' referring to ignorance and obscuring.
JBS: ... the previous two states, 'I am ignorant', and 'Brahman does not exist or shine in my view' also certainly belong to the Jīva.
ajñānasyāśrayo brahmety adhiṣṭhānatayā jaguḥ
jīvāvasthātvam ajñānābhimanitvād avādiṣam ||43||
ajñānasya āśrayaḥ brahma iti adhiṣṭhānatayā jaguḥ |
jīva avasthātvam ajñāna abhimanitvāt avādiṣam ||
SS: The ancient teachers said of Brahman as the support of ignorance as a substratum, but ignorance is attributable to Jīva because he identifies himself with it, and feels 'I am ignorant'.
JBS: They (some previous teachers) say that Brahman is the support of Ignorance by reason of its being the substratum. I ascribe (to ignorance) the status of being a state of the Jīva because of its attachment to Ignorance.
jñānadvayena naṣṭe 'sminnajñāne tatkṛtāvṛtiḥ
na bhāti nāsti cety eṣā dvividhāpi vinaśyati ||44||
jñāna dvayena naṣṭe asmin ajñāne tatkṛta āvṛtiḥ |
na bhāti na asti ca iti eṣā dvividhā api vinaśyati ||
SS: By the two kinds of knowledge ignorance is negated, and with it, its effects, and the ideas 'Brahman does not exist' and 'Brahman is not manifest' also perish.
JBS: When this Ignorance disappears on account of the two kinds of knowledge, this two‐fold Screening viz. 'It does not shine', 'It does not exist', born of that (Ignorance), also disappears.
parokṣajñānato naśyed asattvāvṛtihetutā
aparokṣajñānanāśyā hy abhānāvṛtihetutā ||45||
parokṣa jñānataḥ naśyet asattva āvṛti hetutā |
aparokṣa jñānanāśyā hi abhāna āvṛti hetutā ||
SS: By indirect knowledge the misconception that Kūṭastha does not exist is negated. Direct knowledge destroys the result of the obscuring of reality expressed in the idea that Brahman is not manifest or experienced.
JBS: By indirect knowledge, the being the cause of the Screening 'It does not exist' is destroyed. The being the cause of the Screening 'It does not shine' is destroyed by direct knowledge.
abhānāvaraṇe naṣṭe jīvatvāropasaṃkṣayāt
kartṛtvādy akhilaḥ śokaḥ saṃsārākhyo nivartate ||46||
abhāna āvaraṇe naṣṭe jīvatva āropa saṃkṣayāt |
kartṛtva ādi akhilaḥ śokaḥ saṃsāra ākhyaḥ nivartate ||
SS: When the obscuring principle is destroyed, both the idea of Jīva, a mere superimposition, and the grief caused by the worldly idea of agentship are destroyed.
JBS: If, by the elimination of the superimposition of Jīva‐hood, the Screening 'It does not shine' is gone, all the grief, the doer‐ship etc, known as Saṃsāra disappears.
nivṛtte sarvasaṃsāre nityamuktatvabhāsanāt
niraṅkuśā bhavet tṛptiḥ punaḥ śokāsamudbhavāt ||47||
nivṛtte sarva saṃsāre nitya muktatva bhāsanāt |
niraṅkuśā bhavet tṛptiḥ punaḥ śoka asamudbhavāt ||
SS: When the world of duality is destroyed by the experience of one’s being ever released there arise with the annihilation of all grief an unrestricted and everlasting satisfaction.
JBS: When the entire Saṃsāra is gone by the shining of the ever free state, there will be unhampered satisfaction as grief will not come up again.
aparokṣajñānaśokanivṛtty ākhye ubhe ime
avasthe jīvage brūtaṃ ātmānaṃ ced iti śrutiḥ ||48||
aparokṣa jñāna śoka nivṛtti ākhye ubhe ime |
avasthe jīvage brūtam ātmānam cet iti śrutiḥ ||
SS: The Śruti quoted at the beginning of this chapter refers to two of the stages, direct knowledge and the destruction of the grief from which Jīva suffers.
JBS: The Vedic passage 'If he knows the Self' (given in the opening stanza) refers to these two states of the Jīva called direct knowledge and the cessation of sorrow.
ayam iti aparokṣatvam uktam tad dvividham bhavet |
viṣaya svaprakāśatvāt dhiyā api evam tad īkṣaṇāt ||
SS: The direct knowledge of the reality referred to in the Śruti as 'this' (in 'This is the Self') is of two kinds: Ātman is self‐luminous, and the intellect perceives it as self‐evident.
JBS: By the word "This", direct knowledge is denoted. It is of two sorts, one due to the self‐luminous nature of the object and the other due to the cognition of that (self‐luminous nature) by the intellect also that it is so.
parokṣajñānakāle 'pi viṣayasvaprakāśatā
samā brahma svaprakāśam astīty evaṃ vibodhanāt ||50||
parokṣa jñāna kāle api viṣaya svaprakāśatā |
samā brahma svaprakāśam asti iti evam vibodhanāt ||
SS: In indirect knowledge the intellect is aware of the fact that Brahman is self‐evident, and the self‐evidence of Brahman is not the least affected in such intellectual comprehension.
JBS: Even during the period of indirect knowledge, the self‐luminous nature of the object is common, as there is then the knowledge thus 'Self‐luminous Brahman does exist'.
aham brahma iti anullikhya brahma asti iti evam ullikhet |
parokṣajñānam etan na bhrāntam bādha anirūpaṇāt ||
SS: Indirect knowledge, which is the cognition 'Brahman exists' and not the cognition 'I am Brahman', is not erroneous; because in the state of direct knowledge this indirect knowledge is not contradicted but confirmed.
JBS: There may arise a knowledge that Brahman exists without knowing 'I am Brahman'. This is indirect knowledge but not mistaken knowledge as it is not negatived (later on by any other knowledge).
brahma na asti iti mānam cet syāt badhyeta tadā dhruvam |
na ca evam prabalam mānam paśyāmaḥ ataḥ na bādhyate ||
SS: If it could be proved that Brahman' does not exist, this indirect knowledge would be subject to refutation, but it is well known that there is no valid evidence to refute the fact that Brahman exists.
JBS: If there were any (strong) authority showing that Brahman does not exist, certainly this knowledge will be negatived. But we see however no such strong authority and therefore it is not negatived.
vyakti anullekha mātreṇa bhramatve svargadhīḥ api |
bhrāntiḥ syāt vyakti anullekhāt sāmānya ullekha darśanāt ||
SS: The indirect knowledge of Brahman cannot be called false simply because it does not give a definitive idea of Brahman. On that basis the existence of heaven should also be false.
JBS: If non-perception of a particular object amounts in itself to a mistaken knowledge, even the knowledge of heaven will be a mistaken one as the particular object (namely, heaven) is not known (perceived now) and there is only a knowledge of it generally (vaguely).
aparokṣatvayogyasya na parokṣamatir bhramaḥ
parokṣam ity anullekhād arthāt pārokṣyasaṃbhavāt ||54||
aparokṣatva yogyasya na parokṣa matiḥ bhramaḥ |
parokṣam iti anullekhāt arthāt pārokṣya saṃbhavāt ||
SS: Indirect knowledge of Brahman, that is an object of direct knowledge, is not necessarily false. For it does not aver that Brahman is an object of indirect knowledge only. (Why do we then call it indirect knowledge? For it does not say 'This is Brahman' which is direct knowledge.)
JBS: The indirect knowledge of what is capable of being known directly is not mistaken knowledge for there is no knowledge that it is indirect. Indirectness arises only by implication.
aṃśa agṛhīteḥ bhrāntiḥ cet ghaṭa jñānam bhramaḥ bhavet |
niraṃśasya api sāṃśatvam vyāvartya aṃśa vibhedataḥ ||
SS: The argument that indirect knowledge is false because it does not give a full knowledge of Brahman does not hold good. We may know only a part of a pot, but this partial knowledge is not false on that account. Though Brahman has no real parts, It appears to have parts due to false superimposed adjuncts, which indirect knowledge removes.
JBS: If because of the non-perception of a portion it is considered to be a mistaken knowledge, even the knowledge of a pot will be a mistaken one. There can only be partfulness even in a partless thing by reason of differentiation caused by a portion which has to be discarded.
asattvāṃśo nivarteta parokṣajñānatas tathā
abhānāṃśanivṛttiḥ syād aparokṣadhiyā kṛtā ||56||
asattva aṃśaḥ nivarteta parokṣa jñānatas tathā |
abhāna aṃśa nivṛttiḥ syāt aparokṣa dhiyā kṛtā ||
SS: Indirect knowledge removes our doubt that Brahman may not exist. Direct knowledge rebuts our poser that It is not manifest or experienced.
JBS: By indirect knowledge the aspect of non-existence will vanish. Similarly the vanishing of the non-shining aspect is caused by direct knowledge.
daśamaḥ asti iti vibhrāntam parokṣajñānam īkṣyate |
brahma asti iti api tadvat syāt ajñāna āvaraṇam samam ||
SS: The statement 'The tenth exists, is not lost' is indirect knowledge, and it is not false. Similarly, the indirect knowledge 'Brahman exists' is not false. In both cases the obscuring of the truth due to ignorance is the same.
JBS: The indirect knowledge "The tenth man exists" is seen to be no mistaken knowledge. Similarly, (the indirect knowledge) "Brahman exists" (is not a mistaken knowledge). (In both cases) the screening by ignorance is the same.
ātmā brahmeti vākyārthe niḥśeṣeṇa vicārite
vyaktir ullikkhyate yadvad daśamas tvam asītyataḥ ||58||
ātmā brahma iti vākya arthe niḥśeṣeṇa vicārite |
vyaktiḥ ullikkhyate yadvat daśamas tvam asi ityataḥ ||
SS: by a thorough analysis of 'Self is Brahman' the direct knowledge 'I am Brahman' is achieved, just as the man after having been told that he is the tenth comes to realize it through reflection.
JBS: When the purport of the sentence "Ātmā is Brahman" is completely enquired into, the particularity is understood, just as from "You are the tenth."
daśamaḥ ka iti praśne tvam eveti nirākṛte
gaṇayitvā svena saha svam eva daśamaṃ smaret ||59||
daśamaḥ ka iti praśne tvam eva iti nirākṛte |
gaṇayitvā svena saha svam eva daśamam smaret ||
SS: If one of the ten asks who is the tenth, the answer is that it is he himself. As he counts he comes to himself, and then realizes that he himself is the tenth (which is direct knowledge).
JBS: When the question "Who is the tenth?" is answered by "You yourself", he then counts including himself and recognises that he himself is the tenth.
daśamo 'smīti vākyotthā na dhīr asya vihanyate
ādimadhyāvasāneṣu na navatvasya saṃśayaḥ ||60||
daśamaḥ asmi iti vākya utthā na dhīḥ asya vihanyate |
ādi madhya avasāneṣu na navatvasya saṃśayaḥ ||
SS: His knowledge that he is the tenth is never negated. Whether he comes to himself at the beginning, the middle or the end of his counting, his knowledge that he is the tenth is never in doubt.
JBS: His recognition "I am the tenth" born of the sentence ("you are the tenth") is not negatived at all. There is no more any doubt that there were only nine before (the teaching) or during (the teaching) or after (the teaching).
sat eva iti ādi vākyena brahma sattvam parokṣataḥ |
gṛhītvā tad tvam asi ādi vākyāt vyaktim samullikhet ||
SS: The Vedic texts, such as 'Before the creation Brahman alone existed', give indirect knowledge of Brahman; but the text 'That thou art' gives direct knowledge.
JBS: After knowing indirectly the existence of Brahman from the sentence "The existent alone" and others, he gets knowledge of the speciality from the sentence "Thou art That" and others.
ādimadhyāvasāneṣu svasya brahmatvadhīr iyam
naiva vyabhicaret tasmād āparokṣyaṃ pratiṣṭhitam ||62||
ādi madhya avasāneṣu svasya brahmatva dhīḥ iyam |
na eva vyabhicaret tasmāt āparokṣyam pratiṣṭhitam ||
SS: When a man knows himself to be Brahman, his knowledge does not vary whether in the beginning, middle or end. This is direct knowledge.
JBS: This recognition of Brahmanhood of himself will not vary at all in the beginning, middle or end. Therefore, its being direct knowledge is established.
janmādikāraṇatvākhyalakṣaṇena bhṛguḥ purā
pārokṣyeṇa gṛhītvātha vicārād vyaktim aikṣata ||63||
janma ādi kāraṇatva ākhya lakṣaṇena bhṛguḥ purā |
pārokṣyeṇa gṛhītvā atha vicārāt vyaktim aikṣata ||
SS: The sage Bhṛgu, in ancient times, acquired indirect knowledge of Brahman by reflecting on Brahman as the cause of the origin, sustenance and dissolution of the universe. He acquired direct knowledge by differentiating the Self from the five sheaths.
JBS: Bhṛgu at first learning indirectly about Brahman from the characteristics, namely, the nature of being the cause of the origin etc. (of all beings) then knows it particularly (as his own Self) from enquiry.
yadi api tvam asi iti atra vākyam na uce bhṛgoḥ pitā |
tathāpi annam prāṇam iti vicārya sthalamuktavān ||
SS: Though Varuṇa, father of Bhṛgu, did not teach him by means of the text 'That thou art', he taught him the doctrine of the five sheaths, and left him to his discriminative enquiry.
JBS: Though Bhṛgu's father did not say here any sentence "you are (Brahman)", still he mentioned the place of enquiry in saying "Food (the gross physical body), Life‐breath (etc)."
annaprāṇādikośeṣu suvicārya punaḥ punaḥ
ānandavyaktim īkṣitvā brahmalakṣmāpy ayūyujat ||65||
anna prāṇa ādi kośeṣu suvicārya punaḥ punaḥ |
ānanda vyaktim īkṣitvā brahma lakṣma api ayūyujat ||
SS: Bhṛgu considered carefully the nature of the food‐sheath, the vital‐sheath, and so forth. He saw in the bliss sheath the indications of Brahman and concluded: 'I am Brahman'.
JBS: By deeply enquiring into the sheaths, Annamaya, Prāṇamaya and others repeatedly, (Bhṛgu) recognised the particularity of Bliss and connected it with the characteristics of Brahman (taught by his father).
satyaṃ jñānam anantaṃ cety evaṃ brahmasvalakṣaṇam
uktvā guhāhitatvena kośeṣv etat pradarśitam ||66||
satyam jñānam anantam ca iti evam brahma svalakṣaṇam |
uktvā guhāhitatvena kośeṣu etad pradarśitam ||
SS: The Śruti first speaks of the nature of Brahman as truth, knowledge and infinity. It then describes the Self hidden in the five sheaths.
JBS: After mentioning the peculiar characteristics of Brahman thus "The Existent, the Conscious, the Limitless", it is pointed out to be in the Kośas as "stationed in the cave".
pārokṣyeṇa vibudhyendro ya ātmety ādi lakṣaṇāt
aparokṣī kartum icchaṃścaturvāraṃ guruṃ yayau ||67||
pārokṣyeṇa vibudhya indraḥ ya ātmā iti ādi lakṣaṇāt |
aparokṣī kartum icchan caturvāram gurum yayau ||
SS: Indra acquired indirect knowledge of Brahman by studying Its attributes. He then went to his teacher four times with a view to gaining direct knowledge of the Self.
JBS: Indra, learning indirectly from the characterisation "That Ātmā which is (free from sin etc.)" and desiring to know it directly, approached his Guru four times.
ātmā vā idam ity ādau parokṣam brahma lakṣitam
adhyāropāpavādābhyāṃ prajñānaṃ brahma darśitam ||68||
ātmā vā idam iti ādau parokṣam brahma lakṣitam |
adhyāropa apavādābhyām prajñānam brahma darśitam ||
SS: In the Aitareya Upaniṣad an indirect knowledge of Brahman is imparted by such texts as 'There was only Ātman before creation'. The Upaniṣad then describes the process of superimposition, and negating it shows that consciousness is Brahman.
JBS: In "This is verily the Self" and so on, Brahman is defined indirectly. Then by imposition and negation, it is shown that Brahman is the Conscious Self.
avāntareṇa vākyena parokṣā brahmadhīr bhavet
sarvatraiva mahāvākyavicārād aparokṣadhīḥ ||69||
avāntareṇa vākyena parokṣā brahmadhīḥ bhavet |
sarvatra eva mahāvākya vicārāt aparokṣadhīḥ ||
SS: An indirect knowledge of Brahman by the intellect can be gained from other Śruti passages also; but direct knowledge is achieved by meditating on the great Sayings of the Śruti.
JBS: Everywhere also, indirect knowledge of Brahman arises from the subsidiary passages and direct knowledge from enquiry into the great passages (which declare the identity of Brahman with the Self as explained in chap. V).
brahmāparokṣyasiddhy arthaṃ mahāvākyam itīritam
vākyavṛttāv ato brahmāparokṣye vimatir na hi ||70||
brahma aparokṣya siddhi artham mahāvākyam iti īritam |
vākyavṛttau ataḥ brahma aparokṣye vimatiḥ na hi ||
SS: In Vākyavṛtti it is said that the great Sayings are intended to give direct knowledge of Brahman. There is no doubt about this fact.
JBS: It is said in the "Vākya Vṛitti" that the Mahāvākyas are intended for attaining direct knowledge of Brahman. There is therefore no difference of opinion in the matter of the direct knowledge of Brahman.
ālambanatayā bhāti yo 'smat pratyayaśabdayoḥ
antaḥkaraṇasaṃbhinnabodhaḥ sa tvaṃpadābidhaḥ ||71||
ālambanatayā bhāti yaḥ asmad pratyaya śabdayoḥ |
antaḥkaraṇa saṃbhinna bodhaḥ sa tvam pada abidhaḥ ||
SS: "In 'That thou art' 'thou' denotes the consciousness which is limited or circumscribed by the adjunct [of] the inner organ and which is the object of the idea and word 'I'."
JBS: That consciousness which is mixed up with the Inner Instrument and seems to be at the base of the conception and the expression as "I" is the direct denotation of the word 'Thou'. (Vākyavṛtti 44)
māyopādhir jagadyoniḥ sarvajñatvādilakṣaṇaḥ
pārokṣyaśabalaḥ satyādy ātmakas tat padābhidhaḥ ||72||
māyā upādhiḥ jagat yoniḥ sarvajñatva ādi lakṣaṇaḥ |
pārokṣya śabalaḥ satya ādi ātmakas tad pada abhidhaḥ ||
SS: "The (absolute) consciousness conditioned by the primeval ignorance, Māyā, which is the cause of the universe, is all‐knowing etc., and can be known indirectly, and whose nature is truth, knowledge and infinity, is indicated by the word 'That'."
JBS: He who has Māyā as His attribute, is the cause of the universe, is characterised by omniscience etc. and is shrouded by indirectness and who is of the nature of the Existent etc. is the direct denotation of the word 'That'. (Vākyavṛtti 45)
pratyakparokṣataikasya sadvitīyatvapūrṇatā
virudhyete yatas tasmāllakṣaṇā saṃpravartate ||73||
pratyak parokṣatā ekasya sadvitīyatva pūrṇatā |
virudhyete yatas tasmāt lakṣaṇā saṃpravartate ||
SS: "The qualities of being mediately and immediately known, and those of existence with a second and absolute oneness are incompatible on the part of one and the same substance. An explanation by implication or what is called on indirectly expressed meaning has, therefore, to be resorted to."
JBS: Inmost‐ness and Externality, Being with a second and Being full – as these are inconsistent with each other in a single thing, Lakṣaṇa therefore applies here. (Vākyavṛtti 46)
tattvamasy ādi vākyeṣu lakṣaṇā bhāgalakṣaṇā
so 'yam ity ādi vākyasthapadayor iva nāparā ||74||
tad tvam asi ādi vākyeṣu lakṣaṇā bhāga lakṣaṇā |
saḥ ayam iti ādi vākya stha padayoḥ iva na aparā ||
SS: "In sentences like 'That thou art' only the logical rule of partial elimination is to be applied, as in the terms of 'that is this, not others'." (i.e., In 'This is Devadatta' we negate the attributes of time and place, both present and past, and take into account only the person himself. Similarly, in the text 'That thou art' we negate the conflicting attributes such as omniscience and the limited knowledge which characterize Īśvara and Jīva respectively, and take into account only the immutable consciousness.)
JBS: The Lakṣaṇa that has to be applied to the sentences 'That Thou Art' and others is the Partial Lakṣaṇa as between the two words in sentences 'That is He' and others and not any other kind of Lakṣaṇa. (Vākyavṛtti 48)
saṃsargo vā viśiṣṭo vā vākyārtho nātra sammataḥ
akhaṇḍaikarasatvena vākyārtho viduṣāṃ mataḥ ||75||
saṃsargaḥ vā viśiṣṭaḥ vā vākyārthaḥ na atra sammataḥ |
akhaṇḍa eka rasatvena vākyārthaḥ viduṣām mataḥ ||
SS: The relation between the two substantives ('thou' and 'that') should not be taken as that of one qualifying the other or of mutual qualification, but of complete identity, of absolute homogeneity. That is, the meaning of the expression, according to competent persons is "what is 'thou' is wholly and fully 'that' and that which is 'that' is wholly and fully 'thou'" – both the terms indicate absolute homogenous consciousness.
JBS: The meaning of a sentence derived from the syntax or by the qualification is not acceptable here. The meaning of the sentence as denoting a single integral object is what is accepted by the learned. (Vākyavṛtti 38)
pratyagbodho ya ābhāti so 'dvayānandalakṣaṇaḥ
advayānandarūpaśca pratyagbodhaikalakṣaṇaḥ ||76||
pratyagbodhaḥ ya ābhāti saḥ advaya ānanda lakṣaṇaḥ |
advaya ānanda rūpaḥ ca pratyagbodha eka lakṣaṇaḥ ||
SS: 'What appears to be the individual conscious Self is of the nature of non‐dual bliss; and non‐dual bliss is no other than the individual conscious Self (so Brahman is Self and Self is Brahman).'
JBS: That which seems to be the inmost consciousness has the characteristic of being the Secondless Bliss. And That which is the Secondless Bliss has the characteristic of being the same as the inmost consciousness. (Vākyavṛtti 39)
ittham anyonyatādātmyapratipattir yadā bhavet
abrahmatvaṃ tvamarthasya vyāvarteta tadaiva hi ||77||
ittham anyonya tādātmya pratipattiḥ yadā bhavet |
abrahmatvam tvam arthasya vyāvarteta tadā eva hi ||
SS: When by mutual identification, it has been irrefutably demonstrated that the consciousness within and Brahman are the same, then the notion that Jīva, who is denoted by the word 'thou', is different from Brahman, at once disappears.
JBS: If thus the sense of mutual identity arises, the idea of non‐Brahmanhood in the Thou‐concept will vanish then itself. (Vākyavṛtti 40)
tad arthasya ca pārokṣyam yadi evam kim tataḥ śṛṇu |
pūrṇa ānanda eka rūpeṇa pratyagbodhaḥ avatiṣṭhate ||
SS: Then the indirectness in the knowledge of Brahman, implied by the word 'thou' in the text also vanishes; and there remains only the consciousness within in the form of absolute bliss.
JBS: The sense of externality in the That‐concept also (will disappear). Even if so, what follows from it? Listen. The inmost consciousness will remain in the form of the Full Bliss itself. (Vākyavṛtti 41)
evaṃ sati mahāvākyāt parokṣajñānam īryate
yais teṣāṃ śāstrasiddhāntavijñānaṃ śobhatetarām ||79||
evam sati mahāvākyāt parokṣajñānam īryate |
yais teṣām śāstra siddhānta vijñānam śobhatetarām ||
SS: Such being the case, those who suppose that the great Sayings can only give an indirect knowledge of Brahman, furnish brilliantly shallow understanding of the scriptural conclusions.
JBS: While the matter stands thus, the knowledge of the conclusions of the Śāstras of those by whom indirect perception (alone) is alleged as the result of the Mahāvākya is certainly very wonderful.
āstām śāstrasya siddhāntaḥ yuktyā vākyāt parokṣa dhīḥ |
svarga ādi vākyavat na evam daśame vyabhicārataḥ ||
SS: (Doubt:) Let alone the conclusion of the scriptures, the knowledge which the scriptural statements give of Brahman can only be indirect, like that which they give of heaven and so forth. (Reply:) This is not invariably so, for the statement 'Thou art the tenth' leads to direct knowledge.
JBS: "Let the conclusion of the Śāstra be (anything). By reasoning, (only) indirect knowledge can arise from a sentence as in the sentences relating to heaven, etc." Not so, for it ( the reasoning) fails in the case of the tenth man.
svato 'parokṣajīvasya brahmatvam abhivāñchataḥ
naśyet siddhāparokṣatvam iti yuktir mahaty aho ||81||
svataḥ aparokṣa jīvasya brahmatvam abhivāñchataḥ |
naśyet siddha aparokṣatvam iti yuktiḥ mahati aho ||
SS: Everyman’s knowledge of himself is a direct experience. It is indeed a remarkable argument to suggest that in our attempt at identification of ourselves with Brahman this direct knowledge, already present, will be destroyed!
JBS: The settled patentness of the Jīva who is by himself patent goes away when he aspires for the nature of Brahman – such a reasoning is indeed wonderful.
vṛddhim iṣṭavato mūlam api naṣṭam itīdṛśam
laukikaṃ vacanaṃ sārthaṃ sampannaṃ tvatprasādataḥ ||82||
vṛddhim iṣṭavataḥ mūlam api naṣṭam iti īdṛśam |
laukikam vacanam sārtham sampannam tvad prasādataḥ ||
SS: You are gracious enough to afford us an example of the well‐known proverb: In going for the interest the capital is lost.
JBS: The popular saying like "To one who wished for an increase, the capital itself was lost" become meaningful by your grace.
antaḥkaraṇasaṃbhinnabodho jīvo 'parokṣatām
arhaty upādhisadbhāvān na tu brahmānupādhitaḥ ||83||
antaḥkaraṇa saṃbhinna bodhaḥ jīvaḥ aparokṣatām |
arhati upādhi sadbhāvān na tu brahma anupādhitaḥ ||
SS: (Doubt:) Jīva, who is conditioned by the inner organ, can be an object of direct knowledge with the aid of this conditioning adjunct; but as Brahman has no real adjunct, a direct knowledge of It is impossible.
JBS: The Jīva who is consciousness mixed with the Inner Instrument is capable of being directly perceived as there is the attribute (namely, the Inner Instrument), but not Brahman as it has no other attributes.
naivaṃ brahmatvabodhasya sopādhiviṣayatvataḥ
yāvad videhakaivalyam upādher anivāraṇāt ||84||
na evam brahmatva bodhasya sopādhi viṣayatvataḥ |
yāvat videha kaivalyam upādheḥ anivāraṇāt ||
SS: (Reply:) Our knowledge of Brahman is not altogether unconditioned, as long as our own bodies, the conditioning adjuncts, persist. That is, adjuncts that condition us positively condition Brahman negatively.
JBS: It is not so, as the perception of Brahman‐hood is (also) of the nature of an objective (perception) of an entity having attributes, as the attribute does not go away till the bodiless singleness is got.
antaḥkaraṇasāhityarāhityābhyāṃ viśiṣyate
upādhir jīvabhāvasya brahmatāyāśca nānyathā ||85||
antaḥkaraṇa sāhitya rāhityābhyām viśiṣyate |
upādhiḥ jīva bhāvasya brahmatāyāḥ ca na anyathā ||
SS: The difference between Jīva and Brahman is due to the presence or absence of the conditioning medium of Antaḥkaraṇa; otherwise they are identical. There is no other difference.
JBS: The attribute for Jīva‐hood and Brahman‐hood is distinct by reason of the accompaniment and the non‐accompaniment of the Inner Instrument, not otherwise.
yathā vidhiḥ upādhiḥ syāt pratiṣedhas tathā na kim |
suvarṇa loha bhedena śṛṅkhalātvam na bhidyate ||
SS: If the presence of something (here the internal organ in the Jīva) is a conditioning adjunct, why not its absence (here of the internal organ in Brahman)? Chains whether of gold or iron are equally binding.
JBS: Just as a (positive) injunction is an attribute, why not a (negative) prohibition also (be an attribute)? By reason of the difference between gold and iron, the chain‐ness (of a gold chain and an iron chain) does not become different.
atad vyāvṛttirūpeṇa sākṣādvidhimukhena ca
vedāntānaṃ pravṛttiḥ syād dvidhety ācāryabhāṣitam ||87||
atad vyāvṛtti rūpeṇa sākṣāt vidhimukhena ca |
vedāntānam pravṛttiḥ syāt dvidhā iti ācārya bhāṣitam ||
SS: The teachers affirm that the Upaniṣads speak of Brahman both by negating what is not Brahman and by affirming positive characteristics.
JBS: The method of exposition by the Upaniṣads is two‐fold – in the form of exclusion of what is not that and in the shape of positive definition – such is the statement of the Ācārya.
ahamarthaparityāgād ahaṃ brahmeti dhīḥ kutaḥ
naivam aṃśasya hi tyāgo bhāgalakṣaṇayoditaḥ ||88||
aham artha parityāgāt aham brahma iti dhīḥ kutaḥ |
na evam aṃśasya hi tyāgaḥ bhāga lakṣaṇayā uditaḥ ||
SS: (Doubt:) If the idea of 'I' is given up, how is the knowledge 'I am Brahman' possible? (Reply:) It is the false parts of 'I' which are to be given up and the true part retained, following the logical rule of partial elimination.
JBS: When the significance of "I" is given up, how can there be any knowledge that "I" am Brahman? Not so, for in the method of partial Lakṣaṇa (mentioned above) the abandonment of a portion only is prescribed (and not the entire significance).
antaḥkaraṇasantyāgād avaśiṣṭe cidātmani
ahaṃ brahmeti vākyena brahmatvaṃ sākṣiṇīkṣyate ||89||
antaḥkaraṇa santyāgāt avaśiṣṭe cidātmani |
aham brahma iti vākyena brahmatvam sākṣiṇi īkṣyate ||
SS: When the internal organ is [negated] what remains is the mere inner consciousness, the witness. In it one recognizes Brahman in accordance with the text 'I am Brahman'.
JBS: When the Inner Instrument is given up, as there is the conscious Self that remains, Brahman‐hood is perceived in that witness by the sentence "I am Brahman".
svaprakāśaḥ api sākṣi eva dhīvṛttyā vyāpyate anyavat |
phala vyāpyatvam eva asya śāstra kṛdbhiḥ nivāritam ||
SS: The inner consciousness, though self‐luminous, can be covered by the modifications of the intellect just as other objects of knowledge are. The teachers of scriptures have denied the perception of Kūṭastha by Cidābhāsa, or consciousness reflected on the intellects.
JBS: The witness itself, though self‐luminous, is enveloped by the mind activity just like any other thing. Its being enveloped by the reflection alone is denied by the authors of the Śāstras.
buddhi tatastha cidābhāsau dvau api vyāpnutaḥ ghaṭam |
tatra ajñānam dhiyā naśyet ābhāsena ghaṭaḥ sphuret ||
SS: In the perception of a jar the intellect and Cidābhāsa are both concerned. There the nescience is negated by the intellect and the pot is revealed by Cidābhāsa.
JBS: The mind and the reflected consciousness in it -- both together envelop the pot. Between them, the ignorance is destroyed by the mind and the pot shines because of the reflected Self.
brahmaṇy ajñānanāśāya vṛttivyāptir apekṣitā
svayaṃ sphuraṇarūpatvān nābhāsa upayujyate ||92||
brahmaṇi ajñāna nāśāya vṛtti vyāptiḥ apekṣitā |
svayam sphuraṇa rūpatvān na ābhāsa upayujyate ||
SS: In the cognition of Brahman the modification of the intellect is necessary to remove ignorance; but, as Brahman is self‐revealing the help of Cidābhāsa is not needed to reveal It.
JBS: In the case of Brahman, the enveloping by mental activity is required for the destruction of ignorance. The reflected Self is not required for the destruction of ignorance. The reflected Self is not required as Brahman is in itself luminous.
cakṣur dīpāv apekṣyete ghaṭāder darśane yathā
na dīpadarśane kintu cakṣur ekam apekṣyate ||93||
cakṣuḥ dīpau apekṣyete ghaṭa ādeḥ darśane yathā |
na dīpa darśane kintu cakṣuḥ ekam apekṣyate ||
SS: To perceive a pot two factors are necessary, the eye and the light of the lamp; but to perceive the light of the lamp only the eye is necessary.
JBS: In seeing a pot, etc, the eye and a light are (both) required; it is not so when the light has to be seen; on the other hand, only one, namely the eye, is required.
sthitaḥ api asau cidābhāsaḥ brahmaṇi ekībhavet param |
na tu brahmaṇi atiśayam phalam kuryāt ghaṭa ādivat ||
SS: When the intellect functions, it does so only in the presence of Cidābhāsa, but in the cognition of Brahman Cidābhāsa is merged in Brahman. In external perception of a pot, Cidābhāsa reveals the pot by its light and yet remains distinct from it.
JBS: Though the reflected consciousness does subsist, it becomes one with Brahman. The Reflection does not however produce anything new in Brahman as it does in the case of the pot etc.
apremeyam anādiṃ cety atra śrutyedam īritam
manasaivam āptavyam iti dhīvyāpyatā śrutā ||95||
apremeyam anādim ca iti atra śrutyā idam īritam |
manasā evam āptavyam iti dhīvyāpyatā śrutā ||
SS: That Brahman cannot be cognized by Cidābhāsa is corroborated by the Śruti: 'Brahman is beginningless and beyond cognition'. But Its cognition by the intellects (in the sense of removing ignorance about It), is admitted by the Śruti 'Brahman can be cognized by the intellect'.
JBS: "It is immeasurable and beginningless" – this (the non‐perceivability by the Reflected Self) is mentioned here by the Veda. In the passage "It has to be reached only by the mind", its being capable of being enveloped by the mind is mentioned.
ātmānam cet vijānīyāt ayam asmi iti vākyataḥ |
brahma ātma vyaktim ullikkhya yaḥ bodhaḥ saḥ abhidhīyate ||
SS: In the first Śruti verse of this chapter, 'When a man has realized the identity of his own Self with That (Paramātman) ...', it is the direct knowledge of Brahman (i.e., 'I am Brahman') that is meant.
JBS: That knowledge which grasps the particularity of Brahman as the Self is mentioned in the passage "If he knows himself as 'I am This' ".
astu bodho 'parokṣo 'tra mahāvākyāt tathāpy asau
na dṛḍhaḥ śravaṇādīnām ācāryaiḥ punar īraṇāt ||97||
astu bodhaḥ aparokṣaḥ atra mahāvākyāt tathāpi asau |
na dṛḍhaḥ śravaṇa ādīnām ācāryaiḥ punaḥ īraṇāt ||
SS: From the great Sayings a direct knowledge of Brahman is obtained, but it is not firmly established all at once. Therefore Śrī Śaṅkarācārya emphasizes the importance of repeated hearing, reflection and meditation.
JBS: From this Mahāvākya, direct perception may arise. Even so, it is not firm as Śravaṇa etc. (hearing, cogitation, concentration etc.) are again prescribed by the Ācārya.
ahaṃ brahmeti vākyārthabodho yāvad dṛḍhī bhavet
śamādisahitas tāvad abhyasecchrvaṇādikam ||98||
aham brahma iti vākya artha bodhaḥ yāvat dṛḍhī bhavet |
śama ādi sahitas tāvat abhyaset śrvaṇa ādikam ||
SS: "Until the right understanding of the meaning of the sentence 'I am Brahman' becomes quite firm, one should go on studying the Śruti and thinking deeply over its meaning as well as practicing the inner control and other virtues."
JBS: "Till the knowledge of the purport of the sentence 'I am Brahman' becomes firm, he, along with Śama (mental restrain) etc., should practice Śravaṇa (hearing) etc." (Vākyavṛtti 49)
bādhaṃ santi hy adārḍhyasya hetavaḥ śruty anekatā
asambhāvyatvam arthasya viparītā ca bhāvanā ||99||
bādham santi hi adārḍhyasya hetavaḥ śruti anekatā |
asambhāvyatvam arthasya viparītā ca bhāvanā ||
SS: The causes of the lack of firmness in the direct knowledge of Brahman are: the occurrence of apparently contradictory texts, the doubt about the possibility of such a knowledge and radically opposed ways of thinking leading to the idea of doership.
JBS: There are certainly causes for want of firmness – the multiplicity of Vedic passages, the improbability of the subject, and mistaken conception.
śākhābhedāt kāmabhedācchrutaṃ karmānyathānyathā
evam atrāpi mā śaṅkīty ataḥ śravaṇam ācaret ||100||
śākha abhedāt kāma bhedāt śrutam karma anyathā anyathā |
evam atra api mā śaṅkī iti ataḥ śravaṇam ācaret ||
SS: Owing to the existence of different systems, dispositions and desires, the Śruti enjoins different kinds of sacrifices etc., in the Karmakāṇḍa. But about the knowledge of Brahman preached in the Upaniṣads there is no scope for doubts; so practice repeated 'hearing' etc., about the truth (for firm conviction).
JBS: Karmas (religious rites) are variously prescribed by the Vedas on account of the difference in the several branches of the Veda and also in the desires (of the individuals performing them). It must not be thought that it is so here (in the enunciation of Brahman) also. Therefore (to prevent just an idea arising) he must practise Śravaṇa.
vedāntānam aśeṣāṇām ādimadhyāvasānataḥ
brahmātmany eva tātparyam iti dhīḥ śravaṇam bhavet ||101||
vedāntānam aśeṣāṇām ādi madhya avasānataḥ |
brahma ātmani eva tātparyam iti dhīḥ śravaṇam bhavet ||
SS: 'Hearing' is the process by which one becomes convinced that the Veda in their beginning, middle and end teach the identity of Jīva and Brahman, and this is the gist of Vedānta.
JBS: The idea that the purport of the Upanishads without exception, in the beginning, middle and end, is only (the identity of) Brahman‐Self is Śravaṇa.
samanvaya adhyāya etad sūktam dhīsvāsthya kāribhiḥ |
tarkaiḥ sambhāvanā arthasya dvitīya adhyāya īritā ||
SS: This subject is well explained by Ācārya Vyāsa and Śaṅkara in the Brahma Sūtras in the section treating of the correct view of the Vedic texts. The second chapter of the same classic treats of 'reflecting' by which one is enabled to establish the doctrine of non‐duality by reasoning which satisfies the intellect and refutes all possible objections.
JBS: This (hearing, that is, getting the conviction that he Upanishads do not differ but are uniform in declaring the nature of Brahman) is well elaborated in the chapter on Samanvaya (concordance, Chapter 1 of Sage Bādarāyana's Brahma Sūtras). In the second chapter the probability (absence of improbability) of the subject is shown by reasonings calculated to bring satisfaction to the intellect.
bahujanmadṛḍhābhyāsād dehādiṣv ātmadhīḥ kṣaṇāt
punaḥ punar udety evaṃ jagatsatyatvadhīr api ||103||