

TIMELINE: LEBANON 1914-1930

Works drawn upon:

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Firro, Kais M. *Inventing Lebanon: Nationalism and the State under the Mandate*. London: I.B. Tauris. 2003.

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Zamir, Meir. *The Formation of Modern Lebanon*. London: Croon Helm. 1985.

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1902 **Henri Lammens**, a Flemish Jesuit priest, **published a series of articles entitled “Tasrih al-Absar,”** arguing that the *mutasarifiyya* was only a single part of a larger Lebanon that comprised an area from the Mediterranean in the west to the al-`Asi (Orontis) Mountain in the east from the Nahr al-Kabir in the north to the Litani in the south (Firro, p. 17).

1908 **Young Turks come to power in Istanbul**. The Maronite Church denounces the Ottoman Parliament convened by the Young Turks. The *mutasarifiyya*'s governing council view the Parliament as an infringement of Mount Lebanon's sovereignty and refuse to send delegates (Firro, pp. 16-17).

Francophile **Bulus Nujaym publishes *La Question du Liban*** in Paris under the pseudonym M. Jouplain, arguing that the *mutasarifiyya* was merely a stepping stone to a sovereign state that with European help would one day become independent. He called for the *mutasarifiyya* to be extended to include Beirut, the Biqa', Bilad Bshara, Marj`iyun and al-Hula in the south and `Akkar in the north. These arguments prefaced the demands of the Lebanese delegations for an independent state of Lebanon the frontiers of which would be comparable to those of the *imara* of Fakhr ad-Din or the Shihabi amirs (Firro, p. 17).

Al-Hizb al-Ithad al-Lubnani is formed in Egypt by Lebanese emigrants including Yusuf as-Sawda, Iskandar `Ammun, August Adib and Antun al-Jumayyl. Within a year it would demand a guarantee by the European powers of an independent Lebanon within its natural frontiers (Firro, p. 18).

1911 **Na`um Mukarzil** founds *Jam`iyat an-Nahda al-Lubnaniyya* in New York (Firro, p. 18).

1912 **Shukri Ghanim**, a Maronite *émigré*, founds the *Comité Libanais de Paris*. At an unspecified time during the First World War he presides over the *Comité Central Syrien* (Firro, p. 19).

Khairallah Khairallah publishes *La Syrie*. Although interested in inter-religious tolerance free from the yoke of the Ottomans, he relates Christian history while omitting that of the Muslims. The book nonetheless does not see serious distinctions between dynamic Arab unity and the creation of a Greater Lebanon (Firro, pp. 23, 214-215).

1913 Early in the year: The **Jam`iyat Bayrut al-Islahiyya** (Beirut Reform Society) is **founded**, and called for provincial autonomy within the Ottoman Empire (Firro, p. 21).

April: **Ottoman authorities dissolve Jam`iyat Bayrut al-Islahiyya**. Christian and Muslim intellectuals living in Paris convene an Arab Congress in Paris to discuss the future of the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire, with a special focus Beirut, Dmascus, Aleppo, Jerusalem and Mount Lebanon (Firro, p. 21). **Mukarzil attends the Arab Congress** (Firro, p. 18).

1914 October: **Ottomans declare martial law in Lebanon** ending the independence that had characterized the *mutasarrifiyya* since 1861. Ohannes Pasha, the governor, resigns. **Ottomans abolish the privileges of the mutasarrifiya** (Zisser, p. 4)

Bishara al-Khuri leaves Beirut for Egypt owing to Lebanese Beirut's close relationship with the French consul, **Georges Picot** (Zisser, p. 18)

Silk, although in decline, **provides 50% of the earnings on Mount Lebanon** (Zamir, *Quest*, p. 86).

1915 **Husayn-MacMahon Correspondence** provides ambivalent backing for a Greater Syrian State (Zamir, *Quest*, p. 1)

The French chambers of commerce begin to pressure the government to create *la Syrie française* between the Taurus in the north and the Sinai in the south (Firro, pp. 18-19).

1916 **Nadra Moutran** publishes his *La Syrie de demain* which argues that from a historical, ethnographic and commercial point of view, Lebanon is an integral part of Syria and not a distinct entity. This definition was influential and differed little from that of Lammens and many other French scholars. Nonetheless the term "Syrians" seems to mean "those who have the true interests of the population at heart and yearn for the creation of a new Syria following a French triumph in the war." While Moutran is clearly aware the Muslims who constitute two-thirds of "Greater Syria's" population might not support this

plan, he discounts them as being too disunited to pose a threat to the plan. France was seen as playing a central part in the proposed regime's security and full independence is seen as a fantasy of idealists who lack all realism.(Firro, pp. 19, 23-24).

Many Christian Lebanese *émigrés* who actually supported the idea of a “Greater Syria” are nonetheless dour with respect to the Hashemite Great Arab Revolt, including **Shukri Ghanim**, the *al-Lubnaniya al-Suriyya fi Misr*, which consisted largely of Maronite and Greek-Orthodox *émigrés* and a small group of Sunnis led by Haqqi (Bek) al-`Azam. In the United States, the *Rabitat Suriyya-Jabal Lubnan lil-Tahrir* (Syrian-Mount Lebanon Alliance for Liberation) rejected Arab identity as an imposition upon Syria itself. This Syrian unity group was comprised by leading figures in Arab literature such as Jubran Khalil Jubran, Mikha'il Nu`ayma, Amin ar-Rihani, Iliya Abu Madi, Nasib `Arida and `Abd al-Masih Hadad and whose president was Ayub Thabit, who would later be president of Lebanon. The *Lajna al-Wataniyya as-Suriyya al-Lubnaniyya* in Brazil argued that the region composed an ethnically unified, religiously diverse area that ought to be a single state (Firro, pp. 19-20)

Firro on the diversity of opinion within Lebanese Christian circles (Firro, pp. 20-21):

The Lebanese-Christian *émigrés* no doubt expressed the positions and perceptions of most of Lebanese-Christian intellectual and religious elites, but, as mentioned, these positions and perceptions varied according to the changing circumstances of the years 1908-1920. Typically many of these intellectuals and elites shifted from Greater Lebanon to Greater Syria and *vice versa*. At the same time, even among those who saw Greater Syria as an historical and “ethnic” entity opinions differed. Some Christian intellectuals, such as Shukri Ghanim and George Samné, were convinced by the end of 1919 that it “respond[ed] to the interests of the Christians of Syria and notable of Mount Lebanon and the adjacent regions of the coast and the Biqa’.” For other Christian intellectuals Syria was the common homeland of all its inhabitants, Christians and Muslims alike. Others, again, believed that, even though they belonged to different religious communities, the Syrians had distinct national characteristics that set them aside from the “Arabs.” These tendencies came up against “Syrian” Muslim intellectuals and elites, notably those of Beirut, who from 1913 increasingly encouraged a kind of “Arab-Syrian nationalism” demanding a share with the Ottomans in a decentralized administration of the Empire.

1917

1918 Conklin on the role of the *mission civilisatrice* in French imperial ideology (Conklin, pp. 5-6):

French imperial ideology consistently identified civilization with one principle more than any other: mastery. Mastery not of other peoples—although ironically this would become one of civilization's prerogatives in the age of democracy; rather, mastery of nature, including the human body, and mastery of what can be called “social behavior.” To put it another way, to be civilized was to be free from specific forms of tyranny: the tyranny of the elements over man, of disease over health, of instinct over reason, of ignorance over knowledge and of despotism over liberty. Mastery in all these realms was integral to France's self-definition under the Third Republic. It was because the French believed that they had triumphed over geography, climate, and diseases to create new internal and external markets, and because they before all other nations had overcome oppression and superstition to form a democratic and rational government, that republican France deemed itself so civilized. By the same token, it was because the inhabitants of the non-European world were perceived to have failed on these same fronts—because they appeared to lack the crucial ability to master—that they were just as obviously barbarians, in need of civilizing.

Andrew and Kanya-Forstner on the role of the *mission civilisatrice* in French imperialism and the development of French imperial ideology (Andrew, pp. 25-27):

It is essential, however, to distinguish the economic rationale with which [the French colonial party] sought to justify expansion, from the nationalist motives that made them colonialists in the first place. Failure to expand, in the view of [prime minister Jules] Ferry and later of the *parti colonial*, would be 'quite simply the high road to decadence'. For France to be true to her destiny, she must 'spread, wherever she is able, her language, her arms, and her genius'. The belief that 'France cannot be France without greatness' and that greatness demanded a great empire was the central article of the colonialist faith. The colonial party was the highest stage not of French capitalism but of French nationalism.

The nationalism of the colonialists had a substantial cultural component. Unlike Britons, who doubted that foreigners could ever learn British ways, French nationalists had no doubt that the values of French civilization were universal... According to the philosophy of 'assimilation propounded during the French Revolution, natives fortunate enough to find themselves under French rule were potential Frenchmen destined for full integration into the universal values of French civilization, irrespective of colour, creed or cultural traditions. By the First World War 'assimilation' had given way to the more flexible concept of 'association', which stressed cooperation between ruler and ruled based on a degree of respect for native customs, beliefs and social structures. The natives were none the less to receive all the benefits of the French civilizing mission.

Among the chief of these benefits was the French language. Educated Frenchmen believed unquestioningly in the supremacy of the French language over all of its competitors as the vehicle of precise, lucid, logical thought... Colonialists saw in the expansion of the empire a means to extend not merely French material power but also the French language and civilization... Not surprisingly, there was a substantial overlap between the leadership of the colonialist movement and of the *Alliance Française*, founded in 1883 in the belief that 'making our language known and loved' would, *inter alia*, contribute to 'the extension beyond the seas of the French race which is increasing too slowly on the continent'. Over a third of the *Alliance's* *comité d'honneur* and *conseil d'administration*... were also active in the colonialist movement.

Conklin on the evolution on the *mission civilisatrice*, particularly the distinction between *assimilation* prior to the First World War and the later policy of *association* (Conklin, pp. 6-7):

A conflation of civilization with mastery was thus a defining and permanent characteristic of French rhetoric; yet the meaning of the *mission civilisatrice* also evolved as the colonial situation itself changed during the period under study. Before 1914, two tenets dominated French civilization doctrine, neither of which can be described as straightforwardly "assimilationist" or "associationist." First, confronted with the economic poverty of the indigenous populations, the French believed that civilization required that they improve their subjects standard of living through the rational development, or what the French called the *mise en valeur*, of the colonies' natural and human resources. This objective, they thought, could best be achieved by building railroads—because railroads would link the interior to the coast and promote the exchange of peoples, currencies, commodities, and ideas—and by improving hygiene to eliminate the parasites deadly to Europeans and Africans. Second, the French insisted that civilization required that the different West African people had to evolve within their own cultures, to the extent that these cultures did not conflict with the republican principles of French civilization. When a conflict arose, the offending African mores were to be suppressed and replaced by French ones. After a prolonged struggle with African leaders in the Western Sudan, four African institutions were singled out for eradication: indigenous languages, slavery, barbaric customary law, and "feudal" chieftaincies. The republican virtues of a common language, freedom, social equality, and liberal justice were to take their place.

In the aftermath of World War I, this definition of France's civilizing mission began to change in subtle ways. Although the French did not renounce their belief that Africans had to evolve along their own lines, the administration no longer dwelt on the theme of eradicating institutions antithetical to French civilization. Instead, it spoke increasingly of the need to "associate" traditional West African chiefs and the first generation of French-educated Africans in policy making. "Association" meant that the members of

the African elite were now supposed to be consulted in all decisions regarding them. In the postwar years French imperial authorities also rejected the formerly held opinion that that railroads alone would trigger the desired increase in the African standard of living. The key to tapping the economic potential of the West African territories, these authorities now believed, was the *mise en valeur* of Africa's human resources. In theory, Africa's *mise en valeur* meant a more intensive focus upon improving the African producer's health and farming methods, compared to methods conditions and practices in the prewar era. In reality, the term reflected a renewed conviction that Africans would never progress unless the French made the progress, and that forcibly inculcating a hitherto absent work ethic constituted a crucial part of the Third Republic's civilizing mission in West Africa. These changes in French civilizing tenets were not arbitrary, but causally linked in part to several local factors, such as gradually improving knowledge of African cultures, and a series of colonial revolts against France's earlier imperial policies. One result of this change was that, after World War I, French civilizing tenets better served French interests than the ones they had replaced.

Andrew and Kanya-Forstner on Robert de Caix's role and policy views at Versailles (Andrew, pp. 170-171):

The most influential position papers on Syria presented at the Quai d'Orsay were those of Robert de Caix. De Caix had been quicker than most *Asiatiques* to come to terms with the changed balance of power in the Middle East. In particular, he believed that the prospect of a French Palestine had gone forever. Indeed, that prospect no longer seemed even desirable. Unlike other enemies of Zionism, de Caix saw with great clarity the extent of its political power. With remarkable foresight he also predicted that whoever received the Palestine mandate would live to regret it: 'Any mandate there is likely to be extremely thorny... The Mandatory... will be subjected to criticisms, to obstacles and to obligations of all sorts.' In the interests of both France and the Syrians, it was better to make a clean break between Syria and Palestine: 'We mustn't have any illusions. The Zionist colonies, which we cannot prevent from spreading, will inevitably destroy the unity of Syria-Palestine, the unity to which the opponents of the 1916 agreement now refer so often. Against [the spread of Zionism] the Syrians of Syria proper can hope for no better protection than the political separation of the two regions.' De Caix's main objective in Palestine as elsewhere in the Middle East, was to preserve the rightful dominance of the French language. His first preference, therefore, was a Belgian mandate. Since he considered Britain likely to object, however, he suggested the Netherlands as a suitable alternative. Happily, 'the Dutch language has no *rayonnement*', and France should try to stipulate that, 'in accordance with tradition..., French will be the official language of the country.' As a last resort, to avoid the cultural havoc consequent upon a British mandate, he was even prepared to consider an American one, though still with the hope that the status of the French language could be secured. For the same reasons of linguistic nationalism, if France were able to obtain compensation for her sacrifice in Palestine, that compensation should be in Armenia. Quite apart from the economic advantages to be gained by allowing France to exploit concessions gained on the eve of the war, an Armenian mandate would 'confirm the supremacy of our language'.

In Syria proper, de Caix's main objective was also to 'maintain our cultural pre-eminence', and he was quite prepared to do so under a League of Nations mandate. He had no sympathy with those extremists in the Syrian party who wanted to turn the country into a protectorate on North African lines. As for seeking to renegotiate the Sykes-Picot agreement, 'no policy could be more imprudent'. The agreement was the only guarantee of French rights, and repudiating it would simply leave the field clear for the British. However imperfect in might be, 'it nevertheless recognizes, in principle, our preponderance over the whole of Syria, including the interior; it thus gives us a possible basis for a resolute policy and allows us to claim, immediately, the administration of the Syrian coast'. Once France was solidly established on the coast, de Caix was confident that the extension of her control over the interior, including Damascus and Aleppo, would simply be a matter of time.

October 1: **Faisal I makes triumphal entry into Damascus** (Zamir, *Quest*, p. 2).

November: **Faisal I arrives in Marseille** (MacMillan, p. 389). Macmillan on his trip (MacMillan, p. 390):

The French, who suspected that the British hoped to use Feisal to weaken their own case for Syria (“British imperialism with Arab headgear,” in the words of one French diplomat), did not want him or Lawrence in France at all and would have stopped them in Beirut if they had known in time. But they hesitated to turn Feisal away at Marseille; there was always a faint chance that he could be detached from the British. Feisal was greeted correctly but coolly and informed that he had no official standing and that he had been badly advised in making his trip. He was dragged off on a tour of the battlefields to keep him away from Paris and Poincaré. The French also doled out a Légion d’Honneur, which Faisal received, as fate would have it, from General Henri Gouraud, who was later to turn him off his throne in Syria.

1919 January: **Emile Eddé returns from Alexandria to Beirut, where he was appointed political advisor to Georges-Picot** (Zamir, *Quest*, p. 71).

January: Just as the Peace Conference is about to debate the territorial future of the provinces of the defunct Ottoman Empire, French merchants and missionaries with a stake in the region came together at the Marseilles Chamber of Commerce to form **the Congrès français de la Syrie in support of the notion of la Syrie française**. Two Lebanese intellectuals, Shukri Ghanim and Dr. George Samné participated (Firro, p. 19).

February 6: **Faisal I presents his case before the Supreme Council at the Versailles Peace Negotiations** (Andrew, p. 186; MacMillan, pp. 391-392).

February 14: **Wilson leaves Paris** for a short trip to the U.S. (MacMillan, p. 392)

February 27: **Weizmann presents the Zionist claims before the Supreme Council** (Andrew, p. 187).

While Wilson was away: **Lloyd-George tries to bully Clemenceau into backing down over Faisal and Syria**. This is to no avail (MacMillan, pp. 392-394).

March 20: **Wilson returns to Paris**. Pinchon and Lloyd-George go over the whole Middle East situation with him. Including Sykes-Picot. **Wilson, disgusted by this “old diplomacy” suggests a fact-finding inquiry** (MacMillan, p. 394).

Maronite Patriarch Elias Hawayik launches a campaign in French government quarters and among the public at large to create a state in Lebanon along Maronite wishes (Zisser, p. 7).

During the year: **Mukarzil and the Jam`iyat an-Nahda al-Lubani** are active among *émigrés* across the United States and **come to support the notion of a Greater Lebanon** in accordance with a map drawn by the military commander of a French expedition to Syria during 1860-1861. **This map is circulated among the Lebanese delegations at Versailles** and Patriarch Hawayik makes specific reference to it in his demands to French diplomats (Firro, p. 18).

July: **Syrian Congress, including members from Lebanon, vote for a Syrian Arab state within the borders of Greater Syria** (Zamir, *Quest*, p. 2).

September: **Faisal is informed that Britain and France had re-opened negotiations on the Middle East.** The British make certain that Faisal does not arrive in London until negotiations with the French were complete (MacMillan, p. 406).

1920 January: **Faisal I returns to Damascus from Paris** without a firm deal from the French (MacMillan, pp. 406-407). He finds that he is unable to curb nationalist enthusiasm in order to implement his deal with Clemenceau (Andrew, p. 215). Andrew and Kanya-Forstner on the situation (Andrew, pp. 215-216):

After his return to Damascus in January 1920, Faisal had failed to reconcile his nationalist followers to the agreement with Clemenceau. He warned a secret committee meeting of *al-Fatat* that rejection of the accord would mean war with France. 'We are ready to declare war on both England and France', was the confident reply. Elated by the meteoric rise of their cause, the leaders of *al-Fatat* and the army officers of *al-Ahd* gravely overestimated their own strength. Faisal did nothing to curb their enthusiasm. Against his better judgement he resigned himself to their policy of guerrilla raids on French garrisons in Lebanon and the Christian communities which supported them. To further put pressure on the French, the Syrian nationalists began to co-operate with Mustafa Kemal. Faisal appointed a Kemalist as governor of Aleppo and allowed Turkish emissaries to spread anti-French propaganda throughout northern Syria. More provocatively still, he rescinded an earlier promise to allow the French use of the Damascus-Aleppo railway, thus forcing them to supply their Cilician garrisons by sea.

February: **Bishara al-Khuri becomes secretary to the government of Mount Lebanon** (Zamir, *Quest*, p. 35).

February: **Third Lebanese delegation** headed by Bishop Abdallah al-Khuri, **goes to Paris to obtain French support for an independent Greater Lebanon.** Emile Eddé is a member of the delegation (Zamir, *Quest*, p. 72).

February: **Faisal I visits General Gouraud**, offering to quell anti-French agitation in Syria on the condition his agents are allowed into Lebanon. Andrew and Kanya-Forstner imply that he couldn't hold back his nationalist supporters and don't mention whether or not the deal was accepted (Andrew, p. 116).

March 8: **Syrian Congress declares independence and elects Faisal I king** in an attempt to forestall France and Britain from implementing their secret wartime agreements with respect to the partition of the Middle East (Zamir, *Quest*, p. 3; Andrew, p. 216; MacMillan, p. 407, although she says March 7).

March: **Bishara al-Khuri takes an active part in opposing the claims of Faisal I over Beirut and Mount Lebanon** (Zamir, *Quest*, p. 35).

March 20: **The Lebanese declare their own independence** adopting a French tri-color flag with a cedar tree (MacMillan, p. 407).

April: **San Remo Conference grants mandate for Syria and Lebanon to France** (Zamir, *Quest*, p. 2)

May 27: General Henri Gouraud is ordered ‘to prepare for the military action which the Sharifian government’s increasingly insolent and threatening attitude has made indispensable’ (Andrew, p. 219).

June 29: The French government informs the British of the upcoming military action against Faisal. The British are warned not to interfere (Andrew, p. 219).

July 14: Gouraud issues an ultimatum to Faisal. Andrew and Kanya-Forstner do not make the content of this ultimatum clear (Andrew, p. 219), but MacMillan says he demands “among other things, unconditional acceptance of the French mandate over Syria and punishment of those who had attacked the French.” (MacMillan, p. 407).

Faisal appeals to the other powers. Gets “sympathies” in response (MacMillan, p. 407).

July 24: French General Gouraud defeats Arabs at Maisalun, routing the Arab forces in a single engagement. **The French proceed to occupy Damascus and expel Faisal and his government** (Zamir, *Quest*, p. 2; Andrew, p. 219; MacMillan, p. 407).

Zamir on the French partition (Zamir, *Quest*, pp. 2-3):

France then carved up what was left of Greater Syria, exploiting its religious, ethnic, sectarian and geographic diversity, into what the nationalists regarded as artificial entities: Greater Lebanon, the Alawite region, Jabal Druze and the autonomous province of Alexandretta. The interior was further divided into the ‘states’ of Damascus and Aleppo. By pursuing its ‘minorities’ policy—relying on the more friendly minority communities—France created what was to become the intractable problem of Syrian unity, the issue that was to undermine its efforts to reach an agreement with Syria. The question of unity would also be a constant source of tension between the Arab Sunni majority and the minorities, and between Syria and Lebanon as well.

Firro supports the bit above on p. 77.

Also (Zamir, *Quest*, p. 8):

The minorities policy and the partition of Syria into entities based on religious, sectarian and geographical considerations, had been influenced, to a great extent, by France’s decision to create a Greater Lebanon as a separate state for Christians. Unlike Jabal Druze, the Alawite region and the sanjak of Alexandretta, also formed at France’s initiative, Lebanon had a well-established nationalist movement, with the Maronite community at its core. Even before the war, the Maronites had aspired to a Lebanese state within extended borders, separate and distinct from Arab Syria and closely linked to France. Indeed, there had been general support in France, both on the right and the left, for Lebanese Christian national aspirations. The French Catholic Church and its missionary orders—particularly the powerful Jesuits who had for centuries been involved in religious, educational and charitable activities in Beirut and Mount Lebanon—also promoted the establishment of a Christian Lebanon. Military circles in Beirut and Paris, which regarded Lebanon as a strategic stronghold of French influence over the hostile interior and the Mediterranean, endorsed independence and strongly opposed linking Lebanon with Syria. French officials at the Quai d’Orsay and the High Commission, as well as army officers and religious orders, used support for an independent Lebanese state to justify Syria’s continued partition. They pointed out that a united Syrian state, with Damascus as its capital, would exert economic and political pressure on Lebanon and undermine its very existence. Similar arguments were voiced by the Lebanese Christians.

Faisal goes into exile, first in Palestine and then in Italy (MacMillan, p. 407).

July: **Robert de Caix**, General Gouraud's secretary, argues to annex Tripoli to Syria in order to create a more favorable Christian-Muslim balance in the future Lebanese state (Zamir, *Quest*, p. 8). He states:

'We know of no reason to annex Tripoli to Lebanon,' he wrote in July 1920. 'It is a Sunni Muslim center, rather fanatic, and not wishing at all to be incorporated in a country with a Christian majority.' Speaking of the choice of Beirut as the seat of Lebanon's government, he wrote that it was 'most questionable whether such a large city... which will no doubt contain half the Lebanese population in a few years, is the most desirable capital for the Mountain, whose character might be greatly altered by the move.' (Zisser, p. 6)

De Caix on the technique of domination (Andrew, pp. 229-230):

The need to reduce costs thus became one of the guiding principles behind the Syrian administration which the French established after the expulsion of Faisal. In general, the government of Syria was to be based on indirect rule and regional autonomy. As one official put it, 'to avoid the constitution of a unitary Syria from the top down, we must begin to build a federative Syria from the bottom up'. De Caix, who had worked out the details of the administrative system even before the final confrontation, recommended the creation of a Greater Lebanon, including the Biqa Valley, as a separate state under French control. Syria proper could then be organized as a federation of autonomous units with local administrations under the guidance of carefully chosen French officers. Such a system, he concluded, 'would give us the maximum authority while leaving the Syrian population the greatest autonomy and local freedom'. De Caix's proposals became the basis for the French administration both in Syria and in Lebanon, whose constitution as a separate state was formally proclaimed in September 1920. 'In claiming a mandate for Syria', ran the official justification for the policy, 'France has not sought to create a new colony but to preserve age-old interests vital for her position in the Mediterranean. She intends to guarantee her influence there under the most liberal conditions and with a minimum of interference.'

August: **General Gouraud annexes the Biqa' Valley to Lebanon** placing Damascus less than fifteen miles from the Lebanese border, and placing the vital road and railway systems there that linked Damascus to Homs, Hama, Aleppo, Tripoli and Beirut in French and Lebanese hands (Zisser, p. 5)

August: **Riyad as-Sulh is sentenced to death *in absentia* by the French authorities** on a charge of anti-French activity in favor of King Faisal I. This charge is later commuted to imprisonment and again commuted to exile abroad. Sulh went to Egypt and later moved to Geneva where he was active on behalf of the Syrian-Palestinian Congress (Zisser, p. 15; Zamir, p. 111).

September 1: **General Henri Gouraud**, the French High Commissioner of the Levant, **proclaims the establishment of the State of Greater Lebanon**, from Nahr al-Kabir in the north to Ra's an-Naqura in the south, from the Mediterranean in the west to the Anti-Lebanon Mountains in the east (Zisser, p. 1)

Zisser on the expanded borders (Zisser, p. 5):

But then the Greater Lebanon of 1920 was not confined to Mt. Lebanon. It included further areas which in the past had only slight links with the mountain region. Instead, both in their historical development and in their present economic and social conditions they had much stronger bonds with Damascus and the interior of Syria and with northern Palestine. Moreover, their population differed greatly from the mountain people. The Biqa' and parts of southern Lebanon for instance, had in the past been part of the province (*vilayet*) of Damascus and the majority of the inhabitants there were Shi'is. Tripoli and its environs had long formed a separate Ottoman *vilayet*. Its principal economic links were with the interior of Syria, in particular, with the towns of Homs and Hama whose exit to the sea was through the port of Tripoli. Most of the inhabitants

were Sunnis. Beirut for its part did indeed have close economic ties with Mt. Lebanon, but had in the past been an independent *sanjak* of its own. At least half of the people of Beirut were Sunnis. Finally, the coastal strip south of Beirut had for most of its history been a *vilayet*, with either Sidon or Acre as the seat of the local Vali; Sunnis and Shi'is formed the majority of the population there.

Andrew and Kanya-Forstner on the French policy of *minoritaire* (Andrew, 235-236):

The limitations on French rule in the Middle East were more severe [than those in West Africa], partly because of the restrictions imposed by the mandates themselves, but largely because of France's own sense of the precariousness of her position. Her power-base in the Middle East was to be a Christian-dominated Greater Lebanon. As Briand explained to Gouraud in 1921: 'This Christian land can be completely assimilated culturally and so brought to rely unreservedly on us in the future.... We must in no circumstances submerge this Christian element in the much larger (Muslim) Arab element surrounding it. In the organization of the mandate, therefore, Lebanon, despite its small size, must retain a position of equality *vis-à-vis* Syria.' Greater Lebanon, however, was an essentially artificial unit, created to strengthen France's hold over the Mediterranean seaboard and to satisfy the Maronites, her only reliable collaborators in the Middle East. By adding the mainly Muslim areas of Tripoli, Beirut, Tyre, Sidon and the Biqa valley to Christian Mount Lebanon, the French assured that their domination would be opposed by almost half the population.

Within the Syrian mandate, the French created artificial divisions if not wholly artificial units. The Druzes were given an independent state in the south, the coastal region of Latakia was turned into an independent state for the Alawis; even Aleppo and Damascus were even placed under separate administrations. According to General Catroux, these divisions 'represented the high commission's reaction against the nationalist conception of a unitary Syria which Faisal had championed. Basing themselves on the doctrine of "Divide and Rule", those who imposed this policy thought that the territorial dismemberment of Faisal's ephemeral kingdom would destroy the national unity which the Emir had forged around his person and so destroy the ideal of independence which he incarnated'. As French representative on the Permanent Mandate Commission, Robert de Caix justified Syria's administrative dismemberment—for which he himself had been largely responsible—on the grounds that Syria's ethnic and religious minorities had to be protected. The justification was not completely spurious, but there can be no doubt that the decisive considerations for the French were political and strategic. As General Huntziger, the military commander in Syria, was to point out in 1935: 'We mustn't forget that the Alawis and the Druzes are the only warlike races in our mandate and make first-rate soldiers among whom we recruit our best *troupes spéciales*. To make the Alawis and Druzes part of Syria would thus deprive us of an excellent base of support and give our potential enemies in the Levant the opportunity to recruit the armed forces which they now lack.'

French efforts to revive silk industry return it to two-thirds of pre-war production (Zamir, *Quest*, p. 86).

End of the year: **The French Mandatory increases taxation in Lebanon.** This is unpopular even with the Maronites (Firro, p. 76).

Georges Samné publishes *La Syrie* in Paris. Ghanim authored the introduction, and following French imperial policy, has abandoned his former defense of the ideal of *la Syrie française* in favor of a neo-Phoenicia, or Greater Lebanon. Samné remains more attached to the older ideal, but his history of Lebanon has been presented to support the French partition plans. Greater Lebanon is to be for Syria what the Nile is Egypt (Firro, pp. 25-26).

There are 80,000 French troops in the Levant. The budget of the High Commission is FF 185 million. Compare with 1930 (Zamir, *Quest*, p. 95). **French expenditure in Lebanon is FF 90 million** (Firro, p. 76).

1921 **Bishara al-Khuri is appointed secretary-general of the Lebanese government** (Zisser, p. 18). He joins the **Progressive Party**, which sought an independent Lebanon and opposed any political ties to Syria. Other party members included **Marquis de Freige, Emile Eddé, Na`um Bakhus, Alfred Naqqash, Michel Chiha, and Yusuf Gemayel** (Zamir, *Quest*, p. 35). Khuri was also affiliated with groups to **revive Lebanon's Phoenician heritage** (Zamir, *Quest*, pp. 35-36).

March 4: **De Caix and Catroux conclude an agreement granting the Druze of Jabal Druze local autonomy with minimal French intervention in their affairs** (Zamir, *Formation*, p. 168).

March: **The High Commissioner issues an *arrêté* to unify all taxes and duties throughout the Greater Lebanon** on the basis of the Ottoman legislation that had been in force in Beirut. The affect of this decision is most keenly felt in southern Lebanon's tobacco-growing regions, as a monopoly tax existed on tobacco dating back to 1876. (Firro, pp. 79-80)

April: **Albert Sarraut's colonial program becomes French government policy**, (Andrew, p. 226)

Andrew and Kanya-Forstner on the Sarraut program (pp. 226-227):

In April 1921, the enormously ambitious colonialist vision of the Empire's economic development also became government policy. Amidst exuberant colonialist fanfares Sarraut presented to the chamber a huge programme of infrastructural development covering every part of the Empire. The programme was intended to end the uncertainty and lack of continuity which had hitherto characterized attempts at colonial development and to provide the 'clear, stable and precise plan' which had been lacking in the past. From 'museums of samples' the colonies would be transformed into 'centres of production'. 'The progressive execution of a large and creative programme of action, carefully and conscientiously elaborated', Sarraut declared, 'will ensure, through the increased strength and prosperity of the whole of *France d'Outre-Mer*, the future strength and prosperity of the *Mère-Patrie*'.

The Sarraut programme, however, was not so much a development plan as an imperial fantasy. Ever since the war years, the popularity of *mise en valeur* had been based on the illusion that it would provide instant, or almost instant, solutions to the economic problems of the metropolis. But colonial government could never be other than very long-term and tremendously expensive. The very economic crisis which the Sarraut plan was intended to solve made its implementation impossible. The deficit on external trade in 1920 was 20.4 milliard francs, even higher than in 1919. During the year, the value of the franc fell by almost half against the pound and the dollar. The even more precipitate fall of the German mark made the prospect of reparations on the scale originally envisaged increasingly remote. Unable to balance the metropolitan budget, France was in no position to spend several milliard francs on the Empire. The most fantastic part of the Sarraut plan was its funding. Both Simon and Klotz had vaguely envisaged a state-financed *Crédit National d'Outre Mer* to provide an annual credit of 450 million francs over a ten-year period for colonial development. By 1920, however, it was unthinkable for parliament to approve colonial expenditures on this scale, and Sarraut abandoned the idea in favour of issuing bonds on the open market. By 1921, this idea too had been abandoned. Sarraut later admitted that he had counted on German reparations to balance the metropolitan budget and free private capital for colonial investment. Without

reparations, he could think of no other solution. Incredibly, his Bill contained no financial provisions at all; these, he promised, would be submitted later. It did not even include an estimate of the total cost.

May 22: **General elections are held for the representative council** (Firro, p. 77).

Beirut's population is 77,820 (Compare with 1932) (Zamir, *Quest*, p. 41). **French expenditure in Lebanon falls to FF 56 million** a cut of roughly FF 34 million (Firro, p. 76).

1922 **Gouraud creates a Syrian Federation** comprising the 'states' of Damascus and Aleppo and the `Alawite region, in order to reduce the cost of government. He tries to convince the Maronite leaders to join, but they refuse (Zamir, *Quest*, p. 7).

Bishara al-Khuri is nominated as head of the Court of Appeal, a position that brings him into close contact with **Charles Dabbas**. He later marries **Michel Chiha's** sister and proceeds to marry the rest of his family well (Zamir, *Quest*, p. 35).

De Caix foils Eddé's attempt to be elected as the head of the Representative Council (Zamir, *Quest*, p. 72)

March: **Electoral law passed** (mentioned in passing, Zamir, p. 63). Firro on the electoral laws (Firro, pp. 77-78):

The two electoral decrees issued in March the following year became the electoral law the Lebanese state applied until 1943.

Greater Lebanon was divided into six constituencies: Beirut, Mount Lebanon, Tripoli, Northern Lebanon, Southern Lebanon, and Biqa`. The "confessional" distribution within the constituencies was fixed in proportion to the size of each community therein and in the Council, according to the division of the total number of representatives. This regional and electoral regime enabled candidates from the different communities to form alliances with others and so form lists. Such alliances, in which the French authorities were heavily involved, reinforced the pro-French elites in the towns and countryside. To promote pro-French candidates, the Mandatory authorities could abort the formation of lists based on political parties or alliances between non-sectarian political forces. The outcome was that the clan rivalries within every community dominated the formation of lists and the course of elections. As a result of these alliances and French intervention a different mixture of elites emerged after the 1922 elections. Alongside urban Christian merchants who had decided to go into politics and had the backing of the French, clan elites in the towns and the countryside were among the first members of the Representative Council.

June: **The French propose a cut of expenditures in the main departments of Lebanese administration. The proposal was rejected by the Representative Council** owing to the resistance of leading Christian Lebanese francophiles (Firro, p. 76).

July 24: **The Council of the League of Nations issues the Declaration of Mandate for Lebanon** (Firro, p. 32).

During the year: **French expenditure in Lebanon drops FF 44 million**, a cut of roughly FF 12 million from the year before (Firro, p. 76).

During the year: **Elections for the Representative Council are held**. The elections are viewed at home and abroad as fixed by the French (Firro, p. 78).

Firro on the shift in relevance of the Druze during the installation of “Greater Lebanon” over the course 1920-1922:

As the French remained supreme in policy making, it was the Maronite and other Christian elites who occupied most senior official posts. This, in turn, enabled them to foster the future political system of the new state. That is, the new political array created in Lebanon between 1920 and 1922 restricted the ability of the leading Druze families to negotiate for official posts and for themselves. Whereas during the period of *al-mutasarrifiyya* they had shown great flexibility in their deals with the Maronite elites, in Greater Lebanon, they found themselves up against new competitors belonging to new elites from beyond Mount Lebanon and the traditional policy-making strata. This weakening in their bargaining power meant a further decline in the status of the community. In the words of a Druze emigrant in Egypt: “What increases my worry is that the situation of the community is going from bad to worse, and their rights are gradually being lost. If such a situation continues for a long time, it will be the most inferior community in Greater Lebanon in contrast to what it was in small Lebanon.”

1923 Gouraud is replaced by Weygand. Syrians again demand unity with Jabal Druze, Alexandretta and Lebanon (Zamir, *Quest*, p. 7).

Summer: The French deal with the **uprising of several groups of Sunni and Shi`ite “brigands” in northern Syria and the Biqa` valley**. While the groups did indeed, pillage, their actions were at least partially politicized. The French portray these groups as outlaws. Arab sources, in contrast, view as members of a resistance against European rule (Firro, pp. 72-74). Firro sees the groups as having different motivations:

Until at least 1926, the Sunni and Shi`i elites in the rural areas felt no pressure to mobilize in a confessional way but adjusted to the new rules of political bargaining by competing between themselves through a network of alliances they formed with their Christian counterparts and the Muslim elites in Beirut and Tripoli. Whereas in the Druza areas, economic pressure on the *fallāhin* went hand in hand with disaffection among the elites, Shi`i and Sunni elites collaborated with the French authorities, which is why the bands in their areas could be contained in years 1920-1921. This may also express why the economic distress and the emergence of new bands in the Shi`i and Sunni areas after 1921 did not lead to the kind of “confessional” strife as flared up in the Druze areas. In the rural Shi`i and Sunni areas such as south Lebanon, Biqā` and `Akkār, the elites represented were generally by absentee landlords [*sic*] and regional politics was conducted in the towns, away from the *fallāhin*.

September: **The Druze governor of Jabal Druze, Salim al-Atrash, dies**. Rivalries between Druze notables leads to the appointment of a French governor, **Captain Cabrillet** who, for the next 20 months, attempts to modernize the area without regard for its conservatism. He antagonizes most of the notables, especially the prominent **Turshan family** (Zamir, *Formation*, p. 168).

1924 Riyad as-Sulh is permitted to return to Lebanon (Zisser, p. 15).

June: **Weygand appoints General Vandenberg governor of Lebanon** to avoid jealous conflict between the confessional communities (Zamir, *Formation*, pp. 152-153).

July: **Weygand decrees the creation of a Syrian state** by uniting the ‘states’ of Damascus and Aleppo. The `Alawite region is disincluded (Zamir, *Quest*, pp. 7-8).

November 29: **Weygand receives a telegram** from the French minister of war **informing him of his replacement by General Sarrail** and of his immediate recall to resume his duties on the Supreme War Council (Zamir, *Formation*, p. 153).

1925 First half of the year: **Druze notables from Jabal Druze go to Beirut to complain to Sarrail about Cabrillet. Sarrail refuses to see them**, claiming that the High Commission had no record of any understanding concerning the autonomy of the Druze on Jabal Druze (Zamir, *Formation*, pp. 168-169).

June: **Michel Chiha is elected to the Representative Council in Beirut's minority seat** (Zamir, *Quest*, p. 37) **Sarrail thwarts the election of Eddé as governor, creating an open confrontation between Eddé and the High Commission. Cayle further prevents Eddé's election to the Representative Council** (Zamir, *Quest*, p. 72; Firro, p. 78) The elections are widely viewed as fraudulent (Firro, p. 78).

July: **Sarrail** instructs his delegate on Jabal Druze to invite hostile notables to Damascus on the pretext of hearing their grievances. Upon their arrival **he has them arrested and imprisoned** (Zamir, *Formation*, p. 169).

Mid-July: **Sultan al-Atrash**, a Druze notable with close ties to the Syrian nationalists, **calls a rebellion against the French** (Zamir, *Formation*, p. 169). The revolt breaks out in Hawrān and soon **grows into a Syrian Arab-nationalist revolt** in which Sunnis, Shī'is and others join (Firro, pp. 78-79).

Early August: **Sarrail sends an insufficiently prepared force under the command of General Michaud to advance on Suwaida**, the capital of Jabal Druze (Zamir, *Formation*, p. 169).

August 3: **Michaud is defeated** by al-Atrash (Zamir, *Formation*, p. 169; Zamir, *Quest*, p. 9). **This adds greatly to al-Atrash's prestige** (Zamir, *Formation*, p. 169).

September: **The revolt spreads to the Biqa`** (Firro, p. 79)

October-November: **Druze advance** from Jabal Druze through Mount Hermon into Wadi al-Taym in the Southern Biqa' Valley. **Druze and Maronites clash in the Shuf Mountains**. Scores of Christian villages are burned, leading the Lebanese Christians to support the French against the nationalists. This becomes a point of acrimony between the two groups (Zamir, *Quest*, p. 10; Firro, p. 79).

November: **The Druze fail to take Rashaya**, forcing the rebels to alter their tactics (Zamir, *Quest*, p. 9)

Riyad as-Sulh is again exiled after taking part in the Syrian Revolt of 1925 (Zisser, p. 15)

November: **General Maurice Sarrail is recalled and Henri de Jouvenel becomes French High Commissioner for Lebanon** (Zisser, p. 13; Zamir, p. 11)

December: **Weygand's decree of 1924 is implemented by Henri de Jouvenel**, Syria's new high commissioner, but has no effect with the Druze revolt is at its peak (Zamir, *Quest*, p. 8).

By the end of the year: **The committee to start preparing the Lebanese constitution is formed.** It is chaired by Musa Nammur (Maronite). Other members: `Umar Da`uq (Sunni), `Abud –Abd ar-Razzaq (Sunni), Fu`ad Arslan (Druze), Subhi Haydar (Shi`i), Yusuf az-Zayn (Shi`i), Petro Trad (Greek Orthodox), Yusuf Salim (Greek Catholic), Rukuz Abu Nadir (Maronite), Shibl Dammus (Greek Orthodox), George Thabit (Protestant) and Michel Chiha (Chaldean—Catholic or Orthodox, Firro doesn't say) (Firro, pp. 32-33).

1926 January: **French PM Briand approves de Jouvenel's attempt to negotiate a treaty with the Syrians and Lebanese a la Britain's treaty with Iraq** (Zamir, *Quest*, p. 12). Zamir on de Jouvenel's approach (Zamir, *Quest*, p. 12):

A month after arriving in Beirut, de Jouvenel sent Briand a detailed plan for the mandated territories. He proposed granting independence to Syria and Lebanon through 30-year treaties, similar to the one that Britain had signed with Iraq. Jabal Druze, the Alawite region and Alexandretta would be incorporated into Syria; the minority interests would be safeguarded through a decentralized administrative system. Organic laws would be elaborated with the participation of the elected representatives of Syria and Lebanon. After the Permanent Mandates Commission had approved the treaties and organic laws, the two countries would begin negotiations to solve their territorial dispute. France would retain its power of arbitration, but would try to persuade the Lebanese Christians to cede Tripoli and the Ba`albeck district to Syria. In January 1926, Briand approved de Jouvenel's proposals and instructed him to proceed with their implementation.

April: **Ahmad Nami is appointed to head a provisional government in the Syria mandate that included three nationalist ministers** (Zamir, *Quest*, p. 13).

May 19: **The constitutional committee presents a draft to the Representative Council** (Firro, p. 33).

Firro on Michel Chiha's central role in drafting the constitution (Firro, p. 33):

In the 1970s the newspaper *al-Nahar* interviewed people who had been privy to the work of the Constitution Committee which revealed that it was almost certainly Michel Chiha who had formulated the draft in French and in the spirit of the French constitution of 1875. Others suggested that Chiha had been influenced by the Egyptian constitution of 1923 or even by that of Belgium of 1831. In the memoirs he published in 1960, Bshara al-Khuri acknowledged that his brother-in-law had played an active role in writing the constitution; he had himself been one of the people Chiha had consulted. At a time when the majority of the Sunni elite were boycotting the new state and the French and some Christians were contemplating a territorial revision, Chiha seemed to have regarded the creation of the constitution as a supreme challenge. As a supporter of Greater Lebanon, and admirer of French culture and democracy, and keenly aware of the problems inherent in the multi-communal structure of the new state, Chiha evidently sought the ideological equilibrium for his constitution that would make Lebanism more acceptable to the Muslims, amalgamate western and eastern values, and assimilate the different outlooks held by the elites of Lebanon's various confessions.

May 23: **The High Commissioner approves the draft as final** without allotting sufficient time for the representative council to discuss it (Firro, p. 33).

May 26: **Lebanese mandate constitution ratified.** This, with some amendment would become the constitution of the republic. **Chamber of Deputies is formed in the same month** as well as a short-lived Senate which ceased to exist after a year. **Charles Dabbas** (Greek Orthodox) **is elected president** by a majority of 44 votes, a cabinet is formed and **Adib Pasha** (Maronite) **is appointed prime minister** (Zisser, p. 13; specific date Zamir, *Quest*, p. 28). Zamir on the institutional structure prescribed by the constitution (Zamir, *Quest*, pp. 29-30):

The constitution defined Lebanon as a 'Republic' with legislative power vested in two houses—a senate and a chamber of deputies. The senate comprised 16 members, seven appointed by the president and nine elected, for a period of six years. The chamber was composed of 30 deputies, elected for four-year terms. Senators and deputies were elected by two-stage universal (male) suffrage in accordance with the 1922 electoral law. As in the constitution of the Third Republic, both houses initially enjoyed considerable power, including election of the president, voting confidence in government and approval of the annual budget. The executive power was exercised by a president and a government. The president was elected for a three-year term by both houses at a joint session, with the right to re-election for an additional term. He had the authority to designate the prime minister, appoint and dismiss ministers, dissolve the chamber with the approval of a three-quarters majority in the senate, and initiate revision of the constitution with the approval of the two houses. He was assisted by a government, whose ministers were individually responsible to the chamber. Each new prime minister was required to present a statement of policy to the chamber and request a vote of confidence. Each October, at the beginning of the winter session, he was to submit to the chamber a budget estimating revenue and expenditure for the coming year, to be discussed and approved, article by article.

Article 95, guaranteeing sectarian representation, albeit provisionally, was appended to the constitution by the Lebanese drafting committee, headed by Shibl Dammus. Although it appeared under the heading of 'concluding and temporary provisions', it was to become an integral part of the constitution. The article read as follows: 'As a provisional measure and according to article 1 of the Charter of the Mandate and for the sake of justice and amity, the sects shall equitably be represented in public employment and in the composition of the Ministry, provided that such measure will not harm the welfare of the state.' Two additional articles stated that 'personal status and religious interests of the population, to whatever religious sect (*millet*) they belong, shall be respected' (Article 9), and that there should be 'no violation of the right of the religious communities (*tawaiif*) to have their own schools.' These articles contradicted, to a certain extent, others in the constitution which stipulated that 'every Lebanese shall have the right to hold public office, no preference being made except on the basis of merit and competence' (Article 12) or that 'a member of Parliament shall represent the whole nation' (Article 27).

Bishara al-Khuri becomes Minister of the Interior (Zamir, *Quest*, p. 45). **Eddé is appointed a senator by de Jouvenel** (Zamir, *Quest*, p. 72). **Muhammad al-Jisr is appointed a senator by de Jouvenel** (Zamir, *Quest*, p.109)

End of May: **De Jouvenel returns to Paris to defend his policies** which were under attack both by government and opposition leaders, which favored a strong hand in the Levant, especially after an **uprising in the Rif in Morocco**. Liberal policies were seen as weakness in the face of the natives (Zamir, *Quest*, pp. 13-14).

June: **Local conspiracy of French colonial officials to restore French glory undermines de Jouvenel in his absence.** According to Zamir (pp. 14-15):

While de Jouvenel was attempting to gain support in Paris, however, his policy was being undermined in the mandated territories by General Gamelin, commander of the French forces in the Levant; Colonel Catroux, the head of the intelligence services; de Reffye, secretary-general and acting high commissioner; and Solomiac, the French delegate to Lebanon. Together, they sought to demonstrate that his conciliatory policy had failed, and persuade the government to send reinforcements for a large-scale offensive against the two main centres of the uprising—Damascus and Jabal Druze. Exploiting the rebel attacks on French positions and on the Christians in Lebanon, they warned Paris that France's prestige and influence in the Levant were in danger. They purposely exaggerated their descriptions of rebel operations in Lebanon, well aware of the effect of such reports on the government, the National Assembly and the public. They encouraged Syrian Nationalist leaders of encouraging the rebel attacks in order to force France to bow to their demands, while simultaneously negotiating an agreement with de Jouvenel. They also blamed the Syrian government, particularly the nationalist ministers, for promoting anti-French and anti-Lebanese activities. And they exploited the heated exchanges between Dabbas and Ahmad Nami over Syrian territorial demands in Lebanon to reinforce their claim that the Syrian government was seeking to undermine Lebanese independence. In June, de Reffye instigated a government crisis in Syria which culminated in the resignation of the nationalist ministers. Officers in the Service de Renseignements discreetly urged Alawite and Druze notables to oppose the incorporations of their regions into Syria. Maronite leaders who had deferred to de Jouvenel and agreed to cede territories to Syria were encouraged by the High Commission to change their stance and publicly denounce him for pursuing a pro-Syrian policy at Lebanon's expense.

July 20: **French reinforcements arrive in Beirut from Morocco** (Zamir, *Quest*, p. 15).

June: **Riyad as-Sulh is exiled to Arwad**. He later escapes to Cairo, continuing to Geneva where he joins up with **Arslan** and **Jabiri** (Zamir, *Quest*, p. 111).

July: **French occupy Suwayda and Ghota, quashing the rebellion**. French army mops up the rest of the resistance until the end of the year. More than 6000 Syrians and 2000 French troops were killed. Thousands were injured (Zamir, *Quest*, pp. 9-10, 15).

Late July: **Briand falls and is replaced by Poincaré as PM** (Zamir, *Quest*, p. 15).

Early August: **De Jouvenel resigns** (Zamir, *Quest*, p. 16).

Zamir on **the impact of Lebanese assistance to France during the Syrian Revolt** (Zamir, *Quest*, pp. 10-11):

Lebanon's role in the revolt intensified the hostility of the Syrian Arab nationalists and the Muslim masses towards the Christians, particularly the Maronites. Indeed, many Syrians believed that, as in 1919-1920, the Maronites had jeopardized their attempt to secure independence and unity and that its control over Lebanon had enabled the French army to avoid defeat. This perception was strengthened by the French right wing, which used the idea of France's moral obligation to protect Lebanese Christians to mobilize public backing for partition and direct administration. The Syrians resented in particular the Maronites' active participation in French military efforts. Declarations of support for the French Mandate by Maronite leaders, including their patriarch, Hawayik, and the fears they voiced of an Arab-Muslim victory, reinforced the nationalists' animosity. They took pains however, to prevent the revolt from escalating into a religious and sectarian conflict by reassuring the Maronites that this was a national, secular struggle, and that their fears were groundless. Yet it was difficult to overcome the deeply-rooted religious and sectarian suspicions. After the Syrian defeat, anger at the Lebanese Christians mounted. It became customary for Syrian politicians, both moderate and militant, to adopt an anti-Lebanese stand in order to enhance their popularity among their own constituents. In meetings with the French, Syrian leaders strongly criticized Lebanon and its government. Khadour Bin Ghabarit, a pro-French Muslim Algerian,

who had been sent by the Quai d'Orsay on a fact-finding mission to Syria, warned that French support for the Maronites was the main source of Syrian animosity toward France.

September: **Henri Ponsot is appointed to succeed de Jouvenel** (Zamir, *Quest*, p. 16)

October: **The Senate and the Deputies begin debating a reduced budget** but are deadlocked (Zamir, *Quest*, p. 47).

Zamir on the political economy of the Lebanese government (Zamir, *Quest*, pp.46-47):

Although Adib's government had undertaken to improve the economy and streamline the administration, it had accomplished very little. Some ministers were simply unqualified, having been appointed for sectarian or political reasons. Once in office, these ministers often selected inefficient and superfluous officials from among their supporters and communities. These officials, in turn, felt obliged to provide for their own relatives and friends. Thus political patronage and the clientele system became integrated into Lebanon's new institutions. Hundreds of unnecessary positions were added to the position, which had been rapidly expanding since 1920. Consequently, over 75 percent of the budget was spent on sustaining an overextended and costly bureaucracy (compared with only 40 percent in Syria), leaving little room for improving the economy. After raising salaries in the public sector yet again, the government was obliged to ask the High Commission for loans from its future share of the Common Interests. Scandal and corruption were continually exposed by the press, which strongly criticized the president, the ministers and the conduct of the senators and deputies. Their criticism was no doubt politically motivated in part, but no doubt reflected public disappointment with the way the new political institutions were being run. Instead of trying to solve the problems, however, President Dabbas and his ministers responded by temporarily suspending the publication of the newspapers—a measure they would frequently adopt in the future.

Zamir on how consociationalism generated constant demand for a larger government (Zamir, *Quest*, p. 45):

The formation of a new government raised the question of distributions of portfolios among the various communities. For the next six years, the question of whether there would be three or seven ministers, and the competition for these positions, were major sources of Lebanon's political instability. There was a strong argument for a small, efficient government. Yet, many politicians favoured a larger one, pointing to the need for representation of each of the six major communities. Moreover, an expanded government provided more ministerial positions, and thereby access to power, prestige and material reward. The principle of sectarian representation was subsequently adopted, and the first government comprised seven ministers: two Maronites and one representative of each of the other large communities: Greek Orthodox, Greek Catholic, Sunni, Shi'ite and Druze.

Mid-October: **Ponsot arrives in Beirut** (Zamir, *Quest*, p. 19).

December: **Auguste Adib Pasha leaves for Paris** to represent Lebanon at talks regarding the Ottoman Public Debt, a convenient escape from the budget crisis. **Bishara al-Khuri is acting PM** (Zamir, *Quest*, p. 47).

During the year: **Dabbas and the government temporarily suspend the publication of newspapers** in response to media criticism of their handling of the budget (Zamir, *Quest*, p. 47).

Khayr ad-Din Ahdab flees to Palestine after collaborating with **Riyad as-Sulh** in assisting Syrian rebels (Zamir, *Quest*, p. 216).

1927 January: **Ponsot returns to Paris** (Zamir, *Quest*, p. 19).

February-May: **Ponsot confers with officials in Paris.** There is widespread chaos as the government is experiencing a severe financial crisis, forcing it to scale back its operations (Zamir, *Quest*, p. 20).

March: **Bishara al-Khuri** conspires with a faction of deputies led by **Georges Tabet**, and **Salim Taqla**, director of the interior, to **oust Adib and assume the premiership.** This bid fails as the deputies were unable to agree on the distribution of portfolios and **de Reffye** and **Solomiac** opposed any change (Zamir, *Quest*, p. 48).

April: A faction of Senators led by **Muhammad al-Jisr, Eddé, Ayub Tabet and Qashu`a** force through a resolution sending **an ultimatum to the government** demanding the reduction of its ministers of the government to three, along with reform of the administration and the judicial system. **These demands are opposed by the Deputies.** Upon hearing of these demands, **Adib**, who was in Paris, **resigned.** **The Senate then attempted to create Muhammad al-Jisr as PM.** This bid fails, as the Sunnis fail to back Jisr because it would be seen as an endorsement of the Lebanese state. **Dabbas emerges in a strengthened position due to these machinations.** The Senate eventually agreed on seven ministers (Zamir, *Quest*, pp. 48-49).

April: **The budget finally passes** (Zamir, *Quest*, p. 47).

Mid-April: **French government decides to reduce the number of troops in the mandated territories to 26,000,** 16,000 of whom would be French and 10,000 would be local (Zamir, *Quest*, p. 20).

May: **In light of budget shortfalls, French decide to make image concessions with the Nationalists.** The French recognize Jabal Druze and the Alawite region as part of Syria and resolved that border disputes between Syria and Lebanon be resolved through negotiations. **If the negotiations failed, Ponsot was to cede Tripoli and Ba`albek to Syria.** The Lebanese constitution was to be altered to abolish its Senate, to strengthen the Lebanese president and prevent any demand in Syria for a similar bicameral legislature that might give them more leverage against a president of whom France might approve. Ponsot was to isolate the nationalists by creating PMs who could govern without their support (Zamir, *Quest*, pp. 21-23).

June: **Ponsot returns to Beirut** (Zamir, *Quest*, p. 23). He consults with Lebanese officials about constitutional reform (Zamir, *Quest*, p. 50).

July-October: **Legislature focuses on constitutional reform** in the face of a loss of confidence due to the budget squabbling and backstabbing (Zamir, *Quest*, p. 49).

During the July-October period: **Bishara al-Khuri begins first premiership** (Zisser, p. 17; Zamir, *Quest*, p. 49). **Khuri plays a central role in pushing through amendments**

to the constitution, despite his own ambivalence. Zamir on Khuri's role (Zamir, *Quest*, p. 50):

While he had misgivings, Khuri, then prime minister, was keen to cooperate with Ponsot, Solomiac and Dabbas—to whom he owed his position—and thus wary of voicing his doubts. He already harboured ambitions to succeed Dabbas in 1929 and deemed it beneficial to take such a step. Although he later attempted in his memoirs, to minimize his role, Khuri fully participated in revising the constitution. In a letter to the high commissioner introducing the proposed amendments, he set out in detail the difficulties of the government in exercising its authority in the face of a strong senate. Apart from giving the government more 'cohesion and stability' by replacing individual with collective ministerial responsibility, all his proposals were concerned with enhancing the power of the president. Consequently, he failed to raise the issue of extending the authority of the government, which was essentially the multi-confessional governing body.

August 24: **Ponsot sends a detailed proposal to Briand for the reform of the Lebanese constitution.** The senate and deputies would be fused into a single chamber of 45 deputies. Two-thirds of these were to be elected, a third to be appointed by the president. Ponsot believed that this would give the High Commission the capacity to "correct" undesirable election outcomes (Zamir, *Quest*, p. 51). **The presidency would be strengthened considerably.** In addition to the capacity to appoint a third of the deputies, the presidency gained the authority to dissolve the chamber, the ability to temporarily postpone laws passed by parliament, the ability to promulgate laws with the approval of the government, the right to enforce the budget should parliament fail to approve it during ordinary or extraordinary sessions. Finally the power of the president to of the republic to initiate amendments to the constitution was also extended (Zamir, *Quest*, p. 54).

Mid-September: **Briand approves Ponsot's proposal** to amend the Lebanese constitution. He warns Ponsot that the high commission should intervene as lightly and as infrequently as possible in the government of the country (Zamir, *Quest*, p. 51).

September: **George Luftallah** (Maronite) and his rich father-in-law, **Najib Sursuk**, Lebanese merchants out of Cairo, accompany French Senator **Etienne Lamercy** on a fact-finding tour to the mandated territories. They meet with **Ponsot** and **Luftallah reveals his intention to run for the presidency.** Ponsot is shocked and alarmed by the Luftallah family's vast resources (Zamir, *Quest*, p. 60).

September 23: **Dabbas presents both houses with a draft of revisions to the Constitution** (Zamir, *Quest*, p. 52).

By the end of September: **Colonel Catroux cautions several newspaper editors to be less acrimonious in the attacks on the proposed Constitutional amendments** (Zamir, *Quest*, p. 52).

October 6: **The Senate passes the constitutional amendments with 12 votes** (Zamir, *Quest*, pp. 52-53).

October 7: **The Deputies pass a similar resolution, with 21 out of 29 votes in favor** (Zamir, *Quest*, p. 53)

October 12: Joint session of Parliament passes revisions with majority. **Lebanon's constitution is revised to abolish its senate.** New balance is 30 elected members and 15 appointed. No-confidence vote requires two-thirds of the Chamber (Zamir, *Quest*, p. 53).

Zamir on the actual impact of the reforms on government stability (Zamir, *Quest*, pp. 53-54):

One of the goals of amending the constitution had been to provide Lebanon with a stable, efficient government. The previous system of individual ministerial responsibility to parliament was replaced with collective responsibility. A no-confidence vote now required at least two-thirds of the deputies, and this was increased in May 1929 to three-quarters (Article 69) Yet subsequent governments continued to be voted out of office, and their efficiency hardly improved. On the other hand, parliament succeeded in raising from three to four the number of deputies allowed to serve as ministers, in a seven-member government.

Zamir on the impact of the reforms on the presidency of the republic (Zamir, *Quest*, pp. 54-55):

Undoubtedly some modification were necessary in order to create a more stable and efficient Lebanese administration. But Ponsot allowed the old guard in the High Commission, led by de Reffye, Solomiac and Catroux, along with a self-centered president and a hesitant prime minister, to introduce changes enabling continued French control of Lebanese politics—albeit indirectly. He may have solved an immediate crisis, but he had created far worse problems for the future. The outcome of a strengthened presidency would become apparent in the presidential elections of 1932 and 1936. With so much at stake, the Maronites and their church were determined, more than ever before, to attain the presidency, and Maronite politicians were to struggle relentlessly for the post.

November: **Colonel Catroux is caught leaking letters to sabotage Ponsot to the media. The Quai d'Orsay asks the Ministry of War to recall Catroux** (Zamir, *Quest*, p. 24).

November-December: Khuri is attacked by both the Namur faction and by the Sa`ad-Jisr-Eddé factions. **Khuri defends his government from two parliamentary votes of no-confidence by blocking the quorum.** After making a deal with Dabbas, **he later resigns** (Zamir, *Quest*, pp. 55-56).

December: **Ponsot orders his top officials to prepare a Syrian constitution to be ready by June** (Zamir, *Quest*, pp. 24-25).

1928 January: **Bishara al-Khuri begins second premiership** (Zisser, p. 18). His strategy is to make a deal with Dabbas, whose leverage against the deputies has been greatly expanded by the constitutional amendment to abolish the Senate. In concert with Dabbas, Ponsot and Solomiac, **Khuri agrees to lead a three-minister government and cut the budget.** This offends both Khuri's enemies and allies. **Khuri fends off attempts to us the Maronite Church to force him to resign through the agency of Bishop Khuri** (Zamir, *Quest*, pp. 56-57).

Zamir on the Khuri government's program (Zamir, *Quest*, pp. 57-58):

Khuri's government initially had more success than its predecessors. Public expenditure was reduced, hundreds of officials dismissed, changes introduced into the judicial and health systems, attempts made to reorganize the police force and gendarmerie, and additional resources allocated to public works, mainly road construction. Many of these measures, especially the dismissal of government employees, were extremely unpopular. Deputies who were no longer able to grant favours to their relatives and clients, or whose protégés in the administration had been dismissed, raised an outcry. The government discredited its own policy by politicizing the administration: most of those dismissed had been allied with the opposition or were Muslims—leading Sunni and Shiite deputies to accuse the government of failing to maintain sectarian and regional balance. Tabet repeatedly clashed with politicians and officials, forcing Khuri to contend with one crisis after another. Newspapers, especially *L'Orient* and *al-Ahrar*, accused the ministers of corruption and embezzlement of public funds, and of using their power to grant lucrative public work contracts to relatives and friends. Khuri's attempts to silence criticism by suspending publications of newspapers evoked strong protests from their editors and journalists to the High Commission and the Quai d'Orsay.

Mid-March: Ponsot orders a partial amnesty for nationalists over his staff's objections and draws criticism from the National Assembly (Zamir, *Quest*, p. 25)

April: With the help of Eddé, as-Sulh returns from exile after his father had undertaken to abstain from politics (Zamir, *Quest*, p. 111).

April: Elections for a 70-member constituent assembly are held in Syria. The vote was rigged by the High Commission and Taj ad-Din al-Husayni, the new Syrian PM, so that the Nationalists would only take 22 seats. The nationalists however, still emerge as a major force in Parliament (Zamir, *Quest*, p. 25).

Zamir on the Syrian Constituent Assembly (p. 25):

Although they comprised less than a third of the assembly, the nationalist deputies exercised considerable influence in the committee formed to elaborate the constitution. Through it, they hoped to compel France to acquiesce in their demands for unity and a treaty. Article 2 therefore declared that Syria, including Lebanon, Transjordan and Palestine, was one indivisible country. The French government could clearly not accept such a provision, which not only negated their plans for Lebanese independence, but pertained to regions under the British mandate. When confronted by the French and the Lebanese Christians, the nationalists responded that when the Lebanese constitution was being formulated, de Jouvenel had undertaken to allow Syria, like Lebanon, to specify its territorial aspirations in its own constitution. Other articles gave the Syrian government the right to organize a national army and empowered the president to conclude treaties, receive ambassadors, grant amnesty and declare martial law. These were unacceptable to Paris. For the next three months, Ponsot desperately sought to narrow the gap between the Quai d'Orsay and the nationalists in order to ensure the ratification of the constitution, but to no avail (Zamir, *Quest*, p. 25).

June: Subhi Haidar represents Ba`albek at a Congress for Syrian unity (Zamir, *Quest*, p. 59).

July: The opposition, led by Namur and Subhi Haidar, collect enough signatures to force President Dabbas to convene an extraordinary session of Parliament to deal with Khuri's crackdown on government spending and heavy-handed attempts to quell opposition (Zamir, *Quest*, p. 58).

August: **Ponsot adjourns Syrian Parliament after it attempts to pass the constitution including the controversial articles** (Zamir, *Quest*, p. 25).

August 9: **Bishara al-Khuri exchanges bitter words with his opponents in Parliament.** Opponents demand an increase in the number of ministers from three to five to accommodate all confessions. (Zamir, *Quest*, p. 58)

Later in August: **Bishara al-Khuri resigns second premiership** (Zisser, p. 18; Zamir, *Quest*, p. 58)

Later in August: **Habib as-Sa`ad** (Maronite) **forms new government.** Five ministers are appointed as requested by Parliament. **Namur** is appointed Minister of the Interior and **Subhi Haidar** is appointed Minister of Finance (Zamir, *Quest*, p. 59).

December: **Luftallah's return from Paris on the same boat as Ponsot causes Dabbas extreme panic** (Zamir, *Quest*, p. 60).

During the year: **Khair ad-Din Ahdab is pardoned and allowed to return to Beirut** where with **Riyad as-Sulh**, he founds *al-`Ahd al-Jadid*, an Arab nationalist newspaper that supported Syrian unity and opposed the mandate and the Lebanese state (Zamir, *Quest*, p. 216).

Budget of the High Commission is FF 623,491 million—compare with 1932 to see impact of Great Depression (Zamir, *Quest*, p. 89).

1929 January-March: **Luftallah buys up all the media coverage he can get** (Zamir, *Quest*, pp. 60-61).

January: **Disagreement on the 30 elected and 15 nominated deputies in the next parliamentary election begins to surface.** The French prefer Subhi Haidar's proposal over that of Musa Namur, as the former provided them with more opportunity to correct the electorate's decisions. The deputies were distributed as follows: 15 Maronites, 10 elected and 5 nominated; 9 Sunnis, 6 elected and 3 nominated; 8 Shi`is, five elected and three nominated; 6 Greek Orthodox, 4 elected and 2 nominated; 3 Druze, 2 elected and 1 nominated; 3 Greek Catholics, 2 elected and 1 nominated; and 1 minority who would be elected (Zamir, *Quest*, pp. 63-64).

March 26: **Dabbas is re-elected with a majority of 42 votes.** With parliamentary elections coming up in June, few deputies saw fit to defy Dabbas or Ponsot (Zamir, *Quest*, p. 61).

February: **Ponsot dissolves the Syrian parliament** (Zamir, *Quest*, p. 25).

April: **Lebanon's constitution is amended to grant the president of the republic a six-year term and expand his power.** The president can now dissolve parliament virtually at will and the president can appoint ministers from outside the Chamber of Deputies.

Owing to the constitutional crisis in Syria, this time, and the upcoming June parliamentary elections, the Chamber does not resist the changes proposed by Ponsot and Dabbas (Zamir, *Quest*, p. 61).

May 8: Deputies pass a motion of no-confidence in Sa'ad's government. Sa'ad resigns (Zamir, *Quest*, p. 62).

As the parliamentary elections drew near, Sa`ad and his ministers, Namur and Haidar, openly exploited their positions to mobilize public support, leading the press to accuse them of pillaging national resources to further their political goals. Dissension in the new government grew as Namur plotted to topple Sa`ad, in an attempt to replace him in the premiership. Namur also clashed with Haidar over the distribution of deputies among the various sects and electoral districts. Many opposition deputies feared that Sa`ad and Namur would rig the elections, as they had in 1925. Indeed, Dabbas was anxious to replace Sa`ad before June to prevent him from supervising the vote. With the presidential elections over and the constitution revised, this goal could now be realized. Publication in the press of a list of candidates whom, it was alleged, Sa`ad intended to support, raised an outcry from his opponents and gave them the opportunity to oust him. On 8 May, after 23 deputies signed a motion of no-confidence in the government, Sa`ad handed in his resignation to President Dabbas.

May: Bishara al-Khuri begins third premiership. Ponsot, Solomiac and Khuri believed he would be the most suitable candidate to supervise the election of the parliament that would elect the president of the republic in 1932 (Zisser, p. 18; Zamir, p. 62).

May: Proportion of deputies needed for vote of no-confidence is raised from two-thirds to three-quarters (Zamir, *Quest*, p. 53)

Atmosphere building up to 1929 Parliamentary elections (Zamir, *Quest*, pp. 61-62):

While the president, ministers and deputies were preoccupied with the presidential and parliamentary elections, Lebanon's economic and social problems deteriorated further. It was true that Beirut was enjoying economic prosperity and the real estate market flourishing, but it was the affluent and well-established families that benefited most from the situation. For average citizens, however, who were moving in ever-greater numbers to the city, the cost of living was rising sharply. In the south, the Beqa valley, Tripoli and north Lebanon, economic conditions improved little. Despite the promises of the various governments, few resources were invested in those regions. The agricultural sector was neglected. Complaints were voiced against the high taxes and the diversion of most of the budget to maintain the overextended, inefficient and corrupt political and administrative systems. Since many families relied on remittances from families in North America, Lebanon was also soon to feel the repercussions of the global economic crisis. Newspapers reflected the disillusionment of a growing number of young and educated Lebanese, many of whom were unemployed. The political intrigues, corruption and nepotism exposed in the press further antagonized the public. Ministers and deputies undermined their standing by trading insults and recriminations.

June 2: First round of Lebanese parliamentary elections are held. 148,701 voters were eligible to elect 706 candidates. Elections were held according to the election law of March 1922. Elections were indirect and based on universal male suffrage. This round was to create an "electoral college" in each of the six electoral districts (Zamir, *Quest*, pp. 63-64). Despite intensive campaigning, only 55,843 voters, or 35 percent of the electorate turned out, with markedly lower turnouts in Tripoli and Beirut owing to Sunni boycotts of the election, protesting their annexation into the Lebanese state (Zamir, *Quest*, p. 66).

June 16: **Second round of Lebanese parliamentary elections are held.** Each electoral college voted for a certain number of deputies assigned to the district from a list of candidates who had received a majority in the first round (Zamir, *Quest*, pp.63-64). The second round was marked by significant bullying, violence and French interference (Zamir, *Quest*, pp. 66-67). Zamir on the second round (excerpt from p. 64):

In the second round on 16 June, the delegates were to elect deputies from a list of the 182 candidates remaining from the original 360. Many dropped out of the race, either because they realized that they had little chance, or were discreetly 'encouraged' to do so by the High Commission or the government. The distribution of the candidates between the various communities was significant. While nine Shiite candidates competed for five seats and 23 Sunnis for six, in other communities the race was much more intense: 83 Maronite candidates competed for ten seats; 19 Druze for two; 27 Greek Orthodox for four; 14 Greek Catholics for two; and seven minorities for one. The Shiite and the Druze families were both dominated by feudal families, but whereas in the former, the notables reached an agreement, in the latter, a deep division emerged, not only between the leading families, but also within them.

June 17: **President Dabbas announces his list of parliamentary appointees.** Khuri, Sa`ad and Eddé are among them (Zamir, *Quest*, p. 67).

July 13: **Khuri secures vote of confidence in his government.** Jisr is re-elected speaker (Zamir, *Quest*, p. 68).

September 18: **Khuri resigns as PM.** Khuri was under significant public criticism and wished to ensure that he did not begin his campaign for the presidency of the republic in 1932 under a cloud (Zamir, *Quest*, p. 68). **Eddé agrees to form a new government** (Zamir, *Quest*, p. 74).

October: **Bishara al-Khuri ends third premiership** (Zisser, p. 18).

October 12: **Eddé forms new government.** His choice of government ministers alienated key factions in parliament and his proclivity for submitting detailed plans opened him to much parliamentary criticism, delaying a vote of confidence (Zamir, *Quest*, p.74).

November 22: **Eddé submits his plan to parliament,** some 40 days after forming a government. By this point, he has lost a great deal of his government's initial drive and was exposed to criticism and manipulation (Zamir, *Quest*, pp. 74-75). **Khuri,** as a former minister of education, **condemns Eddé's plan to close 100 schools.** At this time, most Muslim deputies have yet to take the issue seriously (Zamir, *Quest*, p. 77).

During the course of the year: **Emile Eddé emerges as a popular candidate capable of reforming the government** (Zamir, *Quest*, pp. 69-70).

After Eddé becomes PM: **Eddé opposes granting Régie co-intéressée des tabacs de l'empire expansion of monopoly privileges to Lebanon** (Zamir, *Quest*, pp. 163-164)

December 17: Despite widespread reservation among Lebanese statesman, under public pressure and a veiled French threat to dissolve parliament, **the deputies vote 30 to 6 to grant Eddé a three month grant of emergency power to implement his plan to reform government** (Zamir, *Quest*, p. 75).

Sometime after October: **Riyad as-Sulh is permitted to return to Lebanon** after his old friend, Prime Minister Emile Eddé pleads with the French on his behalf (Zisser, p. 15).

Riyad as-Sulh and his cousin, Khazim as-Sulh proceed to found the Beirut newspaper *an-Nida'*, in which Riyad as-Sulh aired his views (Zamir, *Quest*, p. 111).

Total imports for Lebanon and Syria (most of which passed through Beirut) **are valued at FF 729 million**. Compare with 1936 to see impact of Great Depression. **Total exports are valued at FF 255 million**. Compare with 1934 to see impact of Great Depression (Zamir, *Quest*, p. 85).

1930 January: **Eddé issues scores of decrees to implement drastic tax cuts and reduce the number of government employees**. The decision of the High Commission to reduce Lebanon's share from the Common Interests further increases the impact of these cuts. These personnel cuts cut into the clientele system of Lebanese politics. Further Eddé garners criticism for favoring Beirut over Mount Lebanon and urban development over agricultural development. **The closing of 100 state schools is, in particular, seen as discriminatory to Muslims, as they are more reliant on state education** (Zamir, *Quest*, pp. 75-76).

Zamir on the school crisis (pp. 76-77):

One of the reforms in particular—the closure of 100 state schools—proved to be most controversial, and provoked a crisis that would lead to the eventual downfall of Eddé's government. The question of their children's education had always been extremely sensitive for the Muslims of Lebanon, especially the Sunnis of the coastal towns of Beirut, Tripoli and Sidon. They felt vulnerable to the activities of the various Christian missionary orders that dominated Lebanon's education system, and were concerned that their schools, and those established by the local Christian communities, were undermining not only their Arabic culture and language, but also their religion. The Muslims were well aware of the consequences of France's 'mission civilisatoire' on their coreligionists in North Africa, and feared that they would be exposed to a similar cultural colonization. Yet, many upper and middle class Muslim families, recognizing that a Western education would enable their children to compete with their Christian counterparts, had long been sending them to Christian schools. The overwhelming majority of Muslim pupils however, attended state schools, whose standards were generally low. Many of their teachers were unqualified and the physical facilities inadequate, because of the limited resources allocated to them by the High Commission and the Lebanese government. The closure of these schools was therefore seen as yet another example of discrimination against the Muslims. Some even claimed that the move was a ploy to force Muslim children into the missionary schools. Their apprehensions were reinforced by rumours that the French and some Lebanese Christians intended to replace Arabic script with Latin letters, as Mustafa Kemal had in Turkey. Eddé's decision was therefore regarded with much suspicion and provoked deep resentment among the Muslim public.

Toward the end of January: Muslims raise an outcry against the policies, flooding the Quai d'Orsay with telegrams of protest. **Shaykh Mustafa al-Ghailani**, head of the Muslim Council of Beirut **seizes the opportunity to call for a return the control of waqfs to the community**. Muslims telegram leaders in other Arab countries for support. **Demonstrations are held against France and the Lebanese Christians throughout the neighboring countries** (Zamir, pp. 77-78).

February: ***Al-Ahd al-Jadid* publishes a letter from Hajj Amin al-Husayni, the mufti of Jerusalem, to Ghailani, offering "to provide him with any help he needed at the first signal." Eddé responds by closing the paper *sine die*** (Zamir, *Quest*, p. 78).

February-March: **Schools crisis rages.** Muslims led by Karameh, attack Eddé, while protests rage in other parts of the Arab world. Maronite leaders, all eyeing the presidency as a private goal, criticize Eddé as a dictator (Zamir, *Quest*, pp. 78-82).

March 20: **Eddé's government fails a vote of confidence in parliament.** 27 deputies voted against the government and none cast a vote in favor. **The government resigns *en masse*** (Zamir, *Quest*, p. 82).

Interim: **Dabbas calls on Eddé to form a new government. Eddé offers ministerial positions to 12 candidates, all of whom decline** (Zamir, *Quest*, p. 82)

March 25: **Eddé writes to the president of the republic, informing him of his failure to form a new government.** Consequences of the failure: (1) The French believe talk of Lebanese self-government is premature, (2) Eddé and Khuri engage in a bitter feud which dominates Lebanese politics for the next 13 years, (3) no politician is again willing to attempt institutional reform—corruption and clientalism become the norm, (4) the only Maronite willing to relinquish Muslim territory is defeated and the issue is never again addressed and (5) for the first time since they were annexed, the Sunnis score a clear political victory (Zamir, *Quest*, pp. 82-83).

March 25: **Auguste Adib forms a new government.** This government serves for 26 months and is one of the longest of the mandate (Zamir, *Quest*, p. 117).

April: **Khalid Chihab, at Riyad as-Sulh's initiative, requests in parliament that France replace the mandate with a treaty like Iraq's** (Zamir, *Quest*, p. 113).

May: **Ponsot publishes six decrees comprising organic laws for the mandated territories** (Zamir, *Quest*, p. 94).

June: **Ponsot presents his decrees to the Permanent Mandates Commission in Geneva** (Zamir, *Quest*, p. 94).

June: **Britain reaches a treaty with Iraq, highlighting the lack of coherence on French policy in Greater Syria.** France begins to emulate the British approach as an example (Zamir, *Quest*, p. 84).

June: **High Commission decides to adopt the banderole system in the mandated territories** under which the tobacco industry was taxed by the use of labels affixed to the cigarette packages. Under this system, **Lebanon enjoys lower taxes than the rest of the mandated territories (25% versus 45% in the rest of the territories).** This results in overproduction of tobacco in Lebanon, resented by Lebanese cultivators and manufacturers and repeated complaints from successive Syrian and Alawite governments (Zamir, *Quest*, p. 164).

Through the course of 1930-1931: **Khuri, together with Chiha, Far`un, Taqla and Zakur carefully work quietly to secure Khuri's election.** Large sums of money were made available by the Chiha-Far`un Bank to bribe deputies and journalists. Attempts were also made to sow discord between Emile Eddé, Habib as-Sa`ad and Georges Tabet, and to lure Musa Najur, Tabet's principal ally, into supporting Khuri (Zamir, *Quest*, p. 117).

There are 14,000 French troops in the Levant and the budget of the High Commission is FF 11 million—compare with 1920—down 66,000 troops (or 82.5%) and FF 174 million (or 94.1%). **The entire staff of the High Commission now numbered no more than 356** (Zamir, *Quest*, p. 95).
