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World Risk, Sub-politics, and the Rethinking of the Media: A critique of Ulrich Beck’s “World Risk Society”

 

The world is a remarkably complex and dynamic place in which society faces the difficult task of providing for the needs of the present while minimizing negative impacts on the future ability to do so.  With this in mind, in this paper I will first review Ulrich Beck’s arguments about sub-politics in a world risk society, before unpacking the argument’s internal inconsistencies and insecure foundation.  In the final section of the paper, I will discuss the strengths of Beck’s reasoning and compare it to the arguments that Felix Guatarri asserts in “Three Ecologies”.  Somewhere between the two approaches lies the greatest promise for building a livable and equitable future.

 

In “World Risk Society”, Beck enlists Kant’s concept of a ‘cosmopolitan society’ in which “individuals could directly participate in political decisions” (p. 43).  Beck uses this concept to call upon global citizens to unite in response to the recognition that current nation-state based institutions are incapable of dealing with new global risks which arise as the “unforeseen consequences of…industrial modernization” (p. 2).  Beck’s concept of risk is central to his thesis, and he defines risk as an “institutionalized attempt to foresee and control the future consequences of human action” (p. 3).  In this way, “the concept of risk thus characterizes a peculiar, intermediate state between security and destruction, where the perception of threatening risks determines thought and action” (p. 135).  It is in this state that ecological degradation (both social and environmental) can be addressed through the creation of a new form of politics, new institutions, and a new set of norms made possible through a conscious and reflexive societal transformation.

 

In this sense, Beck envisions an opportunity for new rationalities and ways of being to surface during a period which he labels ‘reflexive modernization’.  By using the term ‘reflexive’ Beck does not intend to imply a period of introspection, but rather he defines it as an automatic societal response to the first, or industrial, modernization which espouses linearity, predictability, and therefore controllability.  Ironically, it is “the very idea of controllability, certainty, or security – which is so fundamental in the first modernity – [that] collapses” as a result of the logic of institutional rationality, which is itself a central characteristic of the Enlightenment project.

 

Beck argues that the first modernity created a set of “fixed norms of calculability, connecting means and ends or causes and effects,” and that “these norms are precisely what ‘world risk society’ has rendered invalid” (p. 4).  In other words, science based, western Enlightenment thought has lead to a widespread belief that dangers can be defined, risks calculated, and technology applied to reduce societal vulnerability to risk.  It is argued that the “invention of the calculus of risks lies in making the incalculable calculable, [and] in this way, a norm system of rules for social accountability creates present security in the face of an open and uncertain future” (p. 52).  This logic has been at work within the capitalist system and has lead to the creation of an ever-growing set of ‘world problems’[1].  Due to the chaotic, unpredictable nature of the world, however, such linear ways of thinking are too narrow and are, in fact, incapable of guaranteeing security in the future.  These norms have guided society for too long, and Beck urges that the time for institutional reform is now.

 

What Beck envisions is the creation of a “new kind of capitalism, a new kind of economy, a new kind of global order, a new kind of society, and a new kind of personal life…[that stresses the] aspect of sameness, and not otherness” (p. 2).  In this sense, Beck is calling for a truly ecological social response to the situation in which global society finds itself today.  By ecological, I refer to an approach that takes into consideration the infinite complexity and connectedness of social, economic, and environmental systems.  For this vision to come to fruition, however, the “hidden power-structure of risk conflicts” (p. 5) must be uncovered and recognized for “power that functions is not perceived” (p. 96).  What is needed now is a new approach that recognizes the global nature of manufactured risks, an approach which is complemented by the creation of new formal and informal institutions that transcend current political boundaries, especially those of the nation-state.  For Beck, “it is necessary for global hazards to begin to shape actions and facilitate the creation of international institutions” (p. 142).

 

The norms of domination built on dualistic understandings of the self versus the other have allowed to flourish “a basic power structure within world risk society, dividing those who produce and profit from risks [from] the many who are afflicted with the same risks” (p. 16)  In other words, the profit motive within capitalist society coupled with the naïve belief that risks can be calculated and controlled through mitigation and preparedness, result in an uneven distribution of not only ‘goods’, but ‘bads’ as well.[2]

 

Beck speaks of risks as borderless in that they are uncontainable, and it is in this sense that world risk society must replace nation-state based institutions with global institutions.  To put this argument another way, because “politics in the structure and rules system of the nation-state amounts to keeping and protecting the established democratic and economic rules of the game,” (p. 92) and because these economic rules, or norms, are based on the faulty logic of industrial modernity which in turn results in social and ecological degradation, these “existing outmoded institutions simply will not do” (p. 93).  As Beck so succinctly puts it, “Reflexive modernization is the age of uncertainty and ambivalence, which combines the constant threat of disasters on an entirely new scale with the possibility and necessity to reinvent our political institutions and invent new ways of conducting politics at social sites that we previously considered unpolitical” (p. 93).   

 

The pivotal question that must be addressed in this argument involves the creation of tangible risks, which is not to be confused with the social construction of risks more generally.  Beck asserts that risks can be understood as both material, or “a product of action”, and immaterial, which involves its “social definition” (p. 23).  It is the former description that is most applicable to this line of argument.   The risks with which Beck is concerned are “those which are manufactured by experts and industries”, for the production of these risks results directly from the application of technological rationality by profit driven industries (p. 4).

 

It is precisely the conscious act of industrial decision-making that lies at the heart of Beck’s argument, for decision-making involves risk analysis, or the ‘rational’ calculation and evaluation (an evaluation based in the faulty, linear logic of the first modernity) of the future costs and benefits of any decisions made today.  What is needed, then, is an alternative logic, “a paradigm shift, [or] a new frame of reference” so that “a new framework for the reinvention of society and politics can be created” (p. 2).  Beck uses the term “sub-politics” to describe this creative and dynamic form of bottom up politics which is able to transcend political borders. 

 

Beck’s optimistic conceptualization of sub-politics is grounded in logic, but is not the only course which world risk society may pursue.  In other words, the vision that Beck describes is by no means a predetermined destiny.  Beck sees the possibility of a future free from the shackles of the logic of industrial modernity, and in this vision, societal decisions are made by consensus rather than by the industrial elite.  It is Beck’s argument that in such a society, traditional power structures arising from Enlightenment based thought will be weakened.  To explain further, Beck lays out the argument that conflict amongst and between scientists, sciences, and other expert disciplines can result in “opposing truths and realities” which work to undermine Enlightenment based logic, and therefore provide a fissure in the system of oppression, and a weakness that can be exploited in order to reverse and smooth out power relations in society (p. 99).  In other words, “If the stability of autonomous systems, institutions and organizations is thus fundamentally based on the constancy and consistency of expert rationality, then this condition can also be reversed…[and] power becomes at risk in institutions when rival expert groups become independent of one another” (p. 99).   The failure of expert rationality to explain phenomena and derive solutions to problems thus provides access for an alternative form of politics and decision-making.

 

Environmental discourses have posed the types of questions to which experts cannot and will not agree.  As such, “the invasion of ecology into the economy opens it to politics…[so that] industry and business become a political undertaking.” (p. 100)  It is the politicization of ecological and technological hazards which has systematically chipped away at the power traditionally held by industry allowing “opportunities for external groups to exert influence” (p. 101).  What risk society theory does so effectively is to place environmental problems not in a single category separate from other social problems, but rather squarely in the center of institutions.  It is argued that this re-placement affords the opportunity for society to avoid the creation of ‘environmental’ problems, or world risks, altogether.

 

So, if environmental discourses create a fissure in the shell of industrial modernity, in what ways can sub-politics force this crack open?  In other words, in what ways can sub-politics manifest itself in the global social-environmental-economic system?  Beck stresses that “individual-collective participation in global action networks is striking and decisive; citizens are discovering that the act of purchase [or non-purchase] can be a direct ballot which they can always use in a political way” (p. 42).  Through widely broadcast boycott tactics, “an active consumer society thus combines and allies with direct democracy – at a world level”  (p. 42).  Presumably these forms of active protest will target industries that externalize global risks while internalizing profit.

 

The power of the mass-media lies in its ability to reach a wide audience, which leads Beck to declare that “the political site of the world risk society is not the street but the television” (p. 44).  By this, he means that, as members of a broad society, Westerners increasingly rely on media outlets to manage and proliferate cultural symbols which work to normalize behavior, and it is for this exact reason that members of a cosmopolitan society must discover and create ways to get their messages broadcast to the public in order to organize and “stage world-wide civil resistance” (p. 46). 

 

In a moment of creative insight, Beck argues that it is the guilty conscience of  consumer activists which motivates such acts of political dissensus.[3]  It is precisely because “all our fingers itch to toss cans of coke out of the car window” that consumer activists felt the need to boycott Shell when the company was considering deliberately sinking a crippled oil rig to dispose of it.  Beck further argues that individual activist’s “capacity [for action] should be all the greater, the simpler and neater the staged symbol, the fewer are the individual costs of public protest actions, and the more easily each person can thereby clear his or her conscience” (p. 44).  In other words, because the sinking of the oil platform (staged symbol) was easy to relate to, and because boycotting Shell cost activists little, critical mass was achieved and the boycott was eventually successful.

 

Essentially Beck sees in the act of purchase a way to transcend representative democracies.  He sees the possibility that individual acts of purchase and non-purchase are a way to cast a vote in a true democracy where there are “no organizational intermediaries, no representative agencies of the popular will, no bureaucracy, no electoral registration, no shopping police, no water cannons, [and] no application forms to hold a demonstration!” (p.44)  In other words, and a bit less passionately, Beck proclaims that “the acts of purchase and casting a ballot…[are] direct, anarchistic forms of politics and protest…which often cost nothing” (p. 44).  It is here that the acts of purchase and non-purchase transform into a form of sub-politics which is initiated and undertaken by the individual.  In this form, sub-politics are able to transcend the boundaries of the nation-state and address issues of world risk.  This is to say, a society consisting of  well disciplined and well educated individuals who are able to make rational decisions can find in sub-politics a way to battle the unevenly oppressive and destructive actions of profit driven firms and industries. 

 

Beck argues that the ecological crisis encapsulated in his concept of world risk is the direct result of ‘organized irresponsibility’ in which the “institutions of modern society must unavoidably acknowledge the reality of catastrophe while simultaneously denying its existence, hiding its origins, and precluding compensation or control” (p. 149).  It is precisely such institutional reliance on linear rationality which makes them responsible for the creation of world risk.  Furthermore, because such institutions are tasked with minimizing societal risk, their pursuit of technological solutions to manufactured risks unveils their irresponsibility to the world public.

 

In summary, what Beck argues for is “the opening up to democratic scrutiny , the previously depoliticized realms of decision-making” (p. 152).  In short, Beck argues that current nation-state politics are unable to deal with the transnational character of world risks, and that nation-state based institutions in fact create and propagate world risks.  He argues that for this reason institutions and norms need to be consciously rethought and remolded to recognize sameness because norms based on otherness have led to uneven power relationships and an uneven distribution of risks.  It is through the recognition of global risks that such a transformation can take place.  The logic of industrial modernity lies at the heart of this argument as the very firms and industries, which create risks in their pursuit of realizing a profit, base their production decisions on a ‘rational’ calculation and evaluation of unknown and unknowable future costs and benefits.  Because such decision-making utilizes faulty logic, new methods of decision-making are desperately needed.  Beck argues that the active and thoughtful consumer choices of purchase and boycott bring the political into a decidedly unpolitical decision-making process, and in this way such sub-politics are able to transcend the confines and constrictions of national borders and representative democracies.  In this sense, Beck creatively and optimistically envisions a truly cosmopolitan world society.

 

Beck’s line of thought has been criticized for being German-centric (Scott, Adam et al.), but to this he responds that “the conflicts [to which his critics reference] arise from national issues that cannot be confined within national boundaries” (p. 148).  While this may be the case, Beck remains unaware of the internal contradictions present in his argument and of the insecure foundations upon which it is built.

 

The first and most glaring flaw within Beck’s line of reasoning is his misappropriated use of the concept of sub-politics.  While his intention is to show that the act of purchase or deliberate non-purchase can indeed be a political act that works to transcend national boundaries, such acts cannot be considered as a movement of the consensus by even the most forgiving accounts.  Indeed, they are not a sub-politics of a direct democracy.  In fact, quite the opposite is the case.  Although such acts do cut across borders, they must be considered the acts of a representative democracy if they are to be considered democratic at all. 

 

In a direct democracy, each citizen is afforded the opportunity to vote once and only once, and each vote is valued equally.  If the assertion that acts of purchase and deliberate non-purchase are to be equated to the act of casting a ballot, then each and every world citizen must be afforded the opportunity to purchase or deliberately boycott each and every consumer item on the market.  This, however, is obviously not the case.  The undeniable truth is that most of the world population are not in a position to cast a vote at all.  Their decision as to whether to purchase or boycott has been made for them.  Furthermore, this is precisely the population that suffers most from the man-made creation of risks, and at the same time, it is they who benefit the least from industrial decision-making. 

 

Therefore, if such decisions are to be considered democratic at all, they must certainly be of the representative democracy type.  It can certainly be argued that many Western consumers are more than willing to cast a vote for a member of these marginalized populations.  For evidence, we need look no further than the Nike boycott which occurred in the United States (and possibly Europe although I am unsure) in response to the company’s employment of child labor in overseas factories. 

 

A similar contention has to do with the fact that not even in the U.S., the ‘wealthiest most powerful nation in the world’, does an entire population have the requisite assets for casting such a vote.  I am certain that if all the members of this marginalized portion of the population were given the chance to purchase a shiny new pair of Air Jordans at least some would (after all, it wasn’t all that long ago that someone robbed and killed another just for their shoes).  Unfortunately, in such a system, these voices will never be heard.  Therefore, such a method of transferring industrial decision-making process to the public, can result in the further deepening of unequal power relations which is precisely one of the characteristics of current society that Beck is trying to address.

 

Even if we ignore these particular logical shortcomings, others come to the fore.  Assuming that all of the world’s citizens had equal access to such a method of voting, these citizens would still have to base their decisions on some type of rational decision-making logic.  As Allen Pred has shown, however, neither perfect knowledge nor the perfect ability to use knowledge can exist.  As a result, such votes will necessarily be made under imperfect conditions which could result in the creation of institutions that are even more dysfunctional than those already in place.  It is just as easy to argue that such decisions could result in better functioning institutions, but my point here, is that these types of decisions still involve calculating the incalculable.  In other words, it is possible that deliberate market interventions that are made with the best of intentions may result in the creation of an even worse situation than the one in which society is now situated.s of direct actions of protest rarely approach zero.  Using Beck’s example of the crippled Shell oil rig, it is easy to see that the costs of boycotting Shell petroleum are quite low.  After all, the tens of thousands of protestors merely had to fill up at a competitor’s pump.  But what happens when we take into consideration that it is the production of the entire industry that has created much greater and more dire world risks?  When a boycott of the entire industry is considered, the costs of protest quickly skyrocket; so much so, in fact, that such a boycott is unthinkable for any extended period of time. 

 

Continuing with this method of critique, let us ignore all of these contradictions and mistaken premises so that we may concentrate on the role of the mass-media.  Beck argues that cultural symbols are created in and mediated by the mass-media, and for this reason, messages of resistance (banner hangings by Greenpeace, etc.) must be broadcast to the general public.  Once again Beck fails to realize that the great bulk of the world population does not have access to CNN (although this is rapidly changing even in countries with desperately low median income levels), and that such messages would therefore privilege the already privileged.  Uneven power relations are thus propagated instead of reversed as decisions would continue to be made by elite members of the world’s population.

 

Even if this was not the case, such messages of resistance are forced to compete with a constant bombardment of advertisements urging consumption and over-consumption which do not end when commercial break are over.  Quite the contrary is true, in fact.  The very news programs by which radical groups like Greenpeace hope to be covered carry strong messages which guide viewers to spend.  Sometimes these messages are more subtle than others and can range from a snow report broadcast from a ski resort to the more blatant directives which inform viewers on the most promising stocks on the market.  While some of these messages are weak, they are plentiful.  Plentiful enough, in fact, to inspire Americans to consume at ever increasing rates.  It logically follows that for opposing messages to gain backing or increase momentum, they must either find a much deeper purchase in the psyche of the individual, or be produced and broadcast in similarly high quantities.  Unfortunately, norms of behavior run too deep to be easily compromised by the infrequent yet deeply felt messages of environmental or social destruction.  It is as if the consumer society cares about such matters, but is only willing to help as long as their input does not become a great burden on their own future.

 

Furthermore, if the deliberate act of non-purchase is analogous to a casting a vote against a firm’s production processes, is it not fair to assume that the similar act of purchase acts as a vote expressing acceptance of such production processes?  If so, the logic of economics does not work well with the logic of democracy and plurality, and it is economic logic that emerges victorious in any capitalist system.  In other words, it matters not the number of ‘no’ votes cast, only the number of ‘yes’ votes.  If the number of ‘yes’ votes is great enough, which is to say that the number of purchases is high enough to overcome the costs of production, production processes will remain unchanged regardless of the fact that the plurality is opposed to such production practices.    

 

In considering sub-politics as method of pursuing direct democratic action, Beck fails to think this theory through to its logical conclusion. If the political nature of consumer choices of purchase are indeed analogous to casting a vote in a direct democracy, and if such a democratic method of indirect decision-making is truly the key to minimizing world risk, then the logical question that follows asks whether the choices of ‘candidates’ includes both good ones and bad.  It is my contention that in many cases the choices left to the consumer public involve choosing between the lesser of the range of evils.  If we look at the Shell example in this light, it becomes apparent that the choice of which petroleum to purchase boils down to a choice among a number of ‘bads’.  Clearly the only ecologically moral choice would be to not use gas at all.  But when we follow this anti-consumption philosophy across the wide and deep range of consumer choices, it quickly becomes apparent that the choice to abandon all products that produce incalculable long-term risks would quickly result in a crippled economy and all of the ‘bads’ that accompany such a collapse (widespread poverty, violence, starvation, WAR, etc.). 

 

These logical difficulties in Beck’s argument for a consumption based ecological movement are powerful, but they do not in any way negate the positive aspects found in his theorization.  The power of Beck’s theory of world risk society lies in its ability to creatively tackle the long-term affects of current industrial practices in such a way as to allow them to be theoretically attended in a fashion which elucidates the inherent difficulties of addressing world risks with nation-state based institutions.  In a sense, these arguments serve a pragmatic role in that they open up the opportunity to rethink the institutions to which western society is currently bound.  While his argument that sub-politics allows direct democracy to be acted out on the world stage has some inherent flaws which could potentially lead to counterproductive results, his theorization about sub-politics affords the opportunity to critically evaluate current institutions in a new and promising light.  It is in this new paradigm of world risk that long-term affects of institutions like the insurance industry can be critically evaluated.  Thus, such an approach provides critical insight not only into how society functions, but as to how society may be able to direct its energies in the future.  Above all, Beck stresses that the future has not been determined, and for this reason, Beck urges members of society to take an active role in constantly re-shaping the future.

 

In this final section, I will compare Beck’s work with that of Felix Guatarri, for it is in the intersection of the two that the best promise for action can be realized.

 

The most promising aspect of Guatarri’s work lies in his concept of dissensus which can be understood in juxtaposition to consensus.  Rather than being a mass movement towards a common goal, Guatarri enlists the concept of dissensus as a mass movement against a common enemy (be it the ideology of capitalism or war, etc.).  It is in this sense that Beck’s concept of sub-politics should be understood.  Whereas Guatarri argues for a new way of being that emphasizes singularity in order to overcome homogenous systems of valorization, Beck’s argument for sub-politics relies in great part on the existence of homogeneity within systems of valorization.  Beck’s argument is based on the belief that members of society do indeed share a common set of values.  For this reason, all that is needed to spark a sub-political movement against industrial practices, is a powerful message to be broadcast by the mass media, one which will talk to the common feelings of internalized ecological guilt felt by everyone.  

 

To Guatarri, the mass-media is a tool which creates a set of universal subjectivities.  To Beck, the mass-media is an outlet which allows for the organization of ‘world-wide civil resistance’.  While both agree that the mass-media works to normalize society, they disagree greatly on what role the media should play in an ecologically friendly world.  Guatarri sees no redeeming qualities in mass-media, whereas Beck sees in the media great possibilities.

 

It is in the intersection of these two opposing points of view that the most realistic hope for the future can be found.  Guatarri has asserted that singularity needs to be adopted and fostered so that diverse points of view and ways of knowing and understanding the world will  not be lost.  In Guatarri’s eyes, it is necessary to protect such diverse epistemologies because there is no single way of knowing the world that takes precedence over others.  As Guatarri sees it, there is a power, tyranny, and blindness that exists in homogeneity, and it is the totalizing, auto-homogenizing power of Integrated World Capitalism that needs to be fought.  In this light it is easy to see the mass-media as a capitalist tool that works to normalize society around a very un-ecological nexus.

 

Unfortunately, alternative media sources, which can spread alternative messages, are not available to the broad public.  Furthermore, such media sources must in general be actively sought out, which means that the great bulk of the consumer population remains ignorant to the messages that they contain.  Unfortunately, neither the mass-media nor its homogenizing affects can be wished away, and it is for this reason I argue that the mass-media must be re-theorized.

 

Beck is content with the homogenizing affects of the mass-media as long as the appropriate ecological viewpoint is being broadcast and ingrained in the public psyche.  This approach, however, assumes that a truth exists, that the Green movement is the best if not only way to recognize and address the ecological crisis.  This type of totalizing approach is very much grounded in the logic of the Enlightenment project and very dangerous indeed. 

 

It is somewhere between Guatarri’s complete refusal of the mass-media, as a capitalist tool of normalization, and Beck’s reliance on the mass-media to disperse and propagate the correct ecological message, that the media should be rethought, redesigned, and placed.  If the media were to act in a more responsible and ecological manner, both Beck and Guatarri could be appeased and a middle ground colonized.  In this manner, broad and diverse messages would be given equal weight and the auto-homogenizing force of the media would be neutralized.  Instead of normalizing consumption and nation-state ways of thinking, the media could be used as a way to unlock new possibilities of social order.  Whether this is a realistic goal or not remains to be seen.  What is certain, however, is that in order for change to occur on a grand scale, it must start somewhere.  It is my firm belief that the role of the media must be scrutinized by those both inside and outside the academic community, in order to creatively imagine new forms of mass-media. 

 

In conclusion, Beck’s theory of a world risk society brings to the forefront of environmental security discourses a multitude of new and creative ways of thinking about the consequences of industrial modernity.  His call for sub-politics, a new form of bottom up politics able to transcend the political boundaries of the nation-state, is well founded and received.  While his argument that the acts of purchase and non-purchase are a democratic form of sub-politics, is riddled with logical difficulties, this should not take away from the power of the theory of a world risk society.  Finally, through this paper, I hope it has become clear that our destiny is not predetermined and as such, individuals can have an impact on shaping it.

Sources

 

·        Beck, Ulrich. (2001).  World Risk Society.  Blackwell Publishers: Massachusetts.

 

·        Dalby, Simon. (2002).  Environmental Security.  University of Minnesota Press: Minnesota.

 

·        Guattari, Felix. (2000). Three Ecologies.  The Athlone Press: New Jersey.

 

·        Wheeler, James, Peter Muller, Grant Thrall, and Timothy Fik. Economic Geography. 3d Edition. John Wiley and Sons, Inc. New York. 1998.